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Constitutionalism, Judicial Review, and the
World Court
Geoffrey R. Watson*
With the end of the Cold War, the U.N. Security Council has
suddenly sprung to life. No longer paralyzed by superpower vetoes,
the Council has embarked on an era of unprecedented activism. In its
resolutions on the Iraq-Kuwait crisis, the Council went far beyond
anything it might have adopted just five years ago: it condemned the
invasion of Kuwait, imposed stiff economic sanctions on Iraq, and
eventually authorized the use of force to expel Iraqi troops from
Kuwait. I More recently, the Council has imposed economic and dip-
lomatic sanctions on Libya, 2 taken an active role in the peace process
in Cambodia, 3 and authorized the use of force for humanitarian pur-
poses in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
4
Some states are concerned that the Security Council's newfouid
activism goes too far-that it infringes on state sovereignty. This
contention has been a running theme of Iraqi complaints about the
Council's resolutions on the Gulf War.' Similarly, several states have
expressed concerns about the Council resolutions ordering Libya to
extradite two Libyans accused of terrorism where extradition may not
have been required by international law and where Libyan law, like
that of many civil-law states, forbids the extradition of Libyan nation-
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Puget Sound School of Law; B.A. Yale University,
J.D. Harvard Law School; Attorney-Adviser, U.S. Department of State, 1987-199 1. 1 would
like to thank Robert Menanteaux, senior research librarian at the University of Puget Sound
School of Law, and Elizabeth Lee, my research assistant, for their invaluable assistance. I would
also like to thank Jonathan B. Schwartz, Assistant Legal Adviser for Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs at the U.S. Department of State, for his helpful comments.
1. See S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2932d mtg. at 19, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46
(1990) (condemning invasion); S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2933d mtg. at 19,
U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 (1990) (imposing embargo); S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess.,
2963d mtg. at 27, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 (1990) (authorizing use of force).
2. See S.C. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3063d mtg. at 2-3, U.N. Doc. SIRES/748
(1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 750 (1992).
3. See S.C. Res. 766, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3099th mtg. (1992) (demanding that all
Cambodian parties cooperate with the U.N. transitional authority in Cambodia).
4. See S.C. Res. 770, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3106th mrg. (1992) (authorizing use of force
to facilitate humanitarian relief); see also S.C. Res. 771, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3106th mtg.
(1992) (relating to war crimes in Bosnia).
5. See, e.g., Paul Lewis, No Hint of Arms Found in Iraqi Ministry, N.Y. TIMeS, July 30,
1992, at A8, (reporting that Iraq, citing its "sovereignty," refused U.N. officials access to Iraqi
ministries notwithstanding Security Council authorization).
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als. 6 As one U.N. official observed, "the critical question is the possible
conflict between preventive diplomacy and the issue of national sov-
ereignty when the U.N. intervenes in a country's internal affairs."
In many legal systems, a mechanism of judicial review resolves
disputes about the proper scope of legislative acts. 8 The U.N. Charter,
however, does not explicitly authorize its principal judicial organ, the
International Court of Justice (the World Court), to review the validity
of acts by the law-making branches of the organization. Chapter 14
of the Charter, like article III of the U.S. Constitution, is silent on
the question. Since certain passages in the negotiating history of the
Charter do suggest the omission of judicial review was deliberate, 9
some leading commentators have concluded that the World Court
lacks any power of judicial review. 10
Libya recently challenged this view by initiating an action in the
World Court to enjoin the United States from pressing its claim for
the extradition of the two Libyan nationals accused in the 1988
bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. 1 Libya
contended that the Security Council resolutions ordering extradition
were ultra vires (and therefore invalid) because they disregarded a
fundamental principle of international law-that a state cannot be
forced to extradite its own nationals. While a majority of the Court
rejected Libya's request for provisional relief, a number of concurring
and dissenting judges expressed a willingness to examine the validity
of Security Council actions. 12 The majority opinion thus averted a
6. See United Nations: Growing Concerns over Role of Security Council, Inter Press Service, Apr.
23, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File, at *1 (noting that "[a]nimosity towards
the Security Council has surfaced again following the application of sanctions against Libya");
S.C. Res. 731, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3033d mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RESl731 (1992)
(calling on Libya to provide a "full and effective response" to requests for extradition), reprinted
in 31 I.L.M. 732 (1992); S.C. Res. .748, supra note 2, at 2-3 (imposing aviation sanctions on
Libya in the event it does not extradite the suspects), reprinted in 31 1.L.M. 750 (1992). See also
infra part I.C (discussing Libya case in more detail).
7. United Nations: Growing Concerns over Role of Security Council, supra note 6, at 1 (quoting
James Jonah, a former special U.N. envoy to Somalia).
8. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); ALLAN R. BREW1,R-CARIAS,
JuDicIAL REviEw IN COMPARATIVE LAw 1-4, 185-88 (1989) (describing European systems of
judicial review).
9. See infra part I.B (discussing relevant negotiating history of Charter).
10. See, e.g., RICHARD FALK, REVIVING THE WORLD COURT 162 (1986); OliverJ. Lissitzyn,
International Law and the Advisory Opinion on Namibia, 11 CoLutm. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 50, 51
(1972).
11. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising
from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), 1992 I.C.J. 114 (Provisional Measures
Order of Apr. 14) [hereinafter Libya v. United States].
12. See id. at 127 (majority holding); id. at 131 (Oda, J., concurring) (noting that Libya
argued that the Council's "coercive reinforcement" of the extradition request violated Libya's
"sovereign rights," but asserting that such a claim would constitute "a totally different litigation"
and that jurisdiction over such a claim would be "certainly a different matter"); id. at 142
(Shahabuddeen, J., concurring) ("Are there any limits to the Councils powers of appreciation?
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potential constitutional confrontation between two organs of the
United Nations, but the concurring and dissenting opinions suggest
that such a confrontation is possible in the future.
This Article considers whether the World Court can and should
review the validity of acts of the Security Council and General Assem-
bly. Part I argues that the text and negotiating history of the U.N.
Charter leave room for the World Court to exercise at least some power
of judicial review but do not delineate the precise scope or effect of
such review. Part II asserts that the World Court has in fact repeatedly
exercised a power of judicial review, albeit deferentially, over acts by
the Security Council and the General Assembly. Part III argues that
the World Court can review the validity of acts by other U.N. organs
without jeopardizing its own legitimacy and explores the proper scope
of review in "constitutional" cases. Finally, Part IV examines the legal
effect of a World Court judgment holding another organ's act to be
ultra vires. This Part considers whether the text and negotiating history
of the U.N. Charter support a "Jeffersonian" model of judicial review,
under which the Court's decisions would be binding only on the
specific parties and U.N. organs involved in the particular case, or a
"judicial supremacy" model, under which the Court's decisions would
also be binding on all parties in all future cases. The Article concludes
by examining the political ramifications of judicial review by the
World Court.
I. THE U.N. CHARTER, THE STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW
A threshold question is whether the U.N. Charter and the Statute
of the International Court of Justice support any form of judicial
review. Although the Charter and Statute have a constitutional char-
acter, they are also treaties, and their interpretation is governed by
principles of treaty law. Under established principles, interpretation
... If there are any limits, what are those limits and what body other than the S.C. is competent
to say what those limits are?"); id. at 156 n. 1 (Bedjaoui, J., dissenting) (asserting that "one
might be led to ponder seriously over the lawfulness of" a resolution that prevents the Court's
exercising its "judicial function"); id. at 196 (Ajibola, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court
will have to consider the validity of resolution 748 at the merits stage, and expressing doubts
on that question); id. at 210 (EI-Kosheri, J., dissenting) (describing resolution 745 as "ultra
vires").
The Court has not yet rendered a decision on the merits. According to State Department
sources, Libya has requested a delayed briefing schedule, and its first brief is not due until late
1993. This timetable suggests that Libya has in mind a negotiated settlement.
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of a particular treaty should rest primarily on its text. 13 Article 32 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties nonetheless permits
recourse to the negotiating history (travaux prearatoires) of the treaty
if the text "[I]eaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure. "14 Accord-
ingly, this Part first analyzes the text of the relevant instruments
before considering their negotiating history.
A. The Text of the U.N. Charter and the Statute of the
International Court ofJustice
Neither the U.N. Charter nor the Statute of the International Court
of Justice directly addresses the question of judicial review. 15 Chapter
IV of the U.N. Charter authorizes the General Assembly to make
non-binding "recommendations" to member states or the Security
Council' 6 and suggests some limits on the Assembly's authority to
make such recommendations, 17 but it does not mention whether the
validity of Assembly recommendations can be reviewed by the World
Court. Chapter V empowers the Security Council to make decisions
binding on all states' and suggests that this power is limited by the
"Purposes and Principles of the United Nations"'19-which include
13. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that "[a] treaty
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose." Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340.
The United States is not party to the Convention but generally regards it as reflecting
customary international law. See generally Maria Frankowska, The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties Before United States Courts, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 281 (1988).
14. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 13, art. 32. The American Law
Institute has suggested that these provisions reflect "inhospitality" to the use of travaux prpar-
atoires. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 325 cmt. e (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] (arguing that this "reluctance" to permit use
of supplementary materials is "not at all" consistent with the practice of U.S. courts). Other
commentators, however, read article 32 as authorizing complete resort to travaux "in accordance
with the American judicial tradition." Frankowska, supra note 13, at 335.
15. In this respect they do not differ from the constitutions of most international organiza-
tions. See Ebere Osieke, Ultra Vires Acts in International Organizations-The Experience of the
International Labour Organization, 48 BIrT. Y.B. INT'L L. 259, 261 (1976-77) (noting that the
charters of most international organizations are silent on the question); id. at 262 (noting that
the International Labour Organisation Constitution is silent on the question). One notable
exception is the European Community, which has established a procedure for judicial review of
"legislative measures" promulgated by the European Council and Commission. See generally
Thomas B. Roberts, Judicial Review of Legislative Measures: The European Court of Justtce Breathes
Life into the Second Paragraph of Article 215 of the Treaty of Rome, 26 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
245 (1988); Christopher Harding, The Review of EEC Regulations and Decisions, 19 COIMION
MKT. L. REV. 311 (1982).
16. U.N. CHARTER art. 10, art. 13, para. 1, art. 14.
17. See id. art. 12, para. 1 (prohibiting Assembly recommendations while the Security Council
is handling a "dispute or situation").
18. See id. art. 25.
19. See id. art. 24, para. 2.
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compliance with international aw2°--but it does not indicate whether
the World Court can review Council decisions for conformity to these
"Purposes and Principles." Chapter VI, which contemplates recom-
mendations (as opposed to binding decisions) by the Council and the
Assembly for the peaceful settlement of disputes, does envision some
role for the Court.2 1 Article 36(3) provides that in making recom-
mendations, the Security Council "should also take into consideration
that legal disputes should as a general matter be referred by the parties
to the International Court of Justice." This provision, however, ob-
viously falls far short of an explicit power of judicial review over
Security Council and General Assembly recommendations for peaceful
settlement of disputes. 22 Chapter VII, which empowers the Security
Council to either make recommendations or decide on measures nec-
essary to maintain international peace and security, says nothing about
any role for the Court in reviewing, Council resolutions. Indeed, it
does not mention the Court at all.
The only part of the U.N. Charter that deals with the Court in any
detail is Chapter XIV, entitled "The International Court of Justice."
Even this Chapter speaks in only the most general terms. Article 92
declares the Court to be "the principal judicial organ" of the United
Nations. Article 93 provides that all states party to the U.N. Charter
are ipso facto parties to the Statute of the Court. Article 94 obliges
states party to disputes before the Court to abide by its judgments
and allows the prevailing party to seek assistance from the Security
Council in the event the losing party fails to comply with the judg-
ment. Article 95 permits states to use other international tribunals to
resolve disputes. Article 96 authorizes the political organs of the
United Nations to seek advisory opinions from the Court on various
questions. No provision of Chapter XIV explicitly addresses judicial
review.
Nevertheless, the term "principal judicial organ" in article 92 might
imply a power of judicial review, 23 particularly if most states agree
20. See id. art. 1, para. 1; id. art. 2, para. 3.
21. See id. art. 36, para. 3; see generally id. arts. 33-38.
22. The drafters of this Chapter apparently saw no need for judicial review over these
recommendations since they would not be binding. See infra part I.B (describing Belgian proposal
to insert explicit power of judicial review into this portion of the draft Charter).
23. The term "principal" also implies that other U.N. organs share the judicial power. It is
indeed well-accepted that other organs may "interpret" the Charter, at least insofar as is necessary
to define the limits of their own authority. See Doc. 933, IV/2/42(2), 13 U.N.C.I.O. Docs.
703, 709 (1945) (noting that each organ will inevitably interpret the Charter in the course of
its day-to-day work); see also Ebere Osieke, The Legal Validity of Ultra Vires Decisions of International
Organizations, 77 Am. J. INT'L L. 239, 242 (1983). Such a system of "concurrent review" is not
inconsistent with a "Jeffersonian" concept of judicial review, in which the Court's decisions are
only binding on the parties and relevant organs in the case at hand. See infra part IV. In any
event, the term "principal" is most likely designed to permit the establishment of other judicial
Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 34
that some "judicial" body must have the authority to examine the
validity of acts of other organs of government. Many of the states that
signed and ratified the Charter do in fact endow one or more of their
domestic "judicial" bodies with the power of judicial review. 24 Some
states permit decentralized judicial review in courts of general juris-
diction (as in the United States), while others confine judicial review
to one or more central "constitutional courts" (as in France). 2' It is
unusual, however, for a state's courts to exercise judicial review when
the constitution or another legislative enactment does not clearly
authorize them to do so; 26 the U.S. experience is probably the excep-
tion and not the rule. 27 It is possible, then, that a European lawyer
might be more inclined to view the Charter's silence as forbidding the
exercise of judicial review than an American lawyer. More likely,
though, the term "principal judicial organ" simply does not resolve
the issue one way or the other.
Other provisions of the U.N. Charter provide little additional
guidance on whether the Court can exercise any power of judicial
review. Article 103 of the Charter, a sort of international supremacy
clause, provides that "obligations under the present Charter" shall
"prevail" over conflicting treaty obligations, but nothing in the text
of the provision suggests it is to be enforced only by the Court.
Moreover, the provision by its terms applies to the obligations of
states, not the acts of U.N. organs. Thus, the Court has sometimes
invoked article 103 to find that pre-existing rights and obligations
under treaties have been superseded by a Security Council resolution, 28
but it has not had occasion to strike down a Security Council resolution
as inconsistent with the Charter.
or quasi-judicial tribunals in the United Nations system, for example a U.N. Court of Human
Rights, or to allow for the establishment of regional courts such as the European Court of
Human Rights. It seems unlikely that the word "principal" alone was meant to preclude the
World Court from exercising judicial review.
24. See EDWARD MCWHINNEY, SUPREME COURTS AND JUDICIAL LAW-MAKING: CONSTiTU-
TIONAL TRIBUNALS AND CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW 1 (1986) (asserting that judicial review "is
one of the more striking trends in constitutionalism and constitution-making of the post-World
War II era").
25. See BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 8, at 168-94 (contrasting centralized with decentralized
systems).
26. See Mauro Cappalletti, Fundamental Guarantees of the Parties in Civil Litigation: Comparative
Constitutional, International, and Social Trends, 25 STAN. L. Ray. 651, 654-59 (1973).
27, Even in the United States, the framers failed to mention judicial review in the Consti-
tution only because they assumed courts would exercise it. See, e.g., 2 MAx FARRAND, RECORDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 28 (rev. ed. 1966) (reporting that Gov. Morris
stated that federal courts would be able to invalidate state laws that "ought to be negatived");
id. at 76 (reporting that Luther Martin observed that the "[c]onstitutionality of laws" would
come before judges); id. at 78 (reporting that George Mason declared that "[judges] could
declare an unconstitutional law void").
28. See, e.g., Libya v. United States, 1992 I.C.J. at 124 (noting that S.C. Res. 748 supersedes
whatever rights Libya may have had under the 1971 Montreal Convention).
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It might be argued that article 103 implicitly authorizes the World
Court to invalidate treaties inconsistent with the Charter, and that
this authorization in turn implies a power to invalidate Security Coun-
cil or General Assembly acts that are ultra vires.29 Even assuming that
the Court can declare treaties invalid, there is again no reason to
suppose that it is the only U.N. organ that can do so. 3 0 And even if
the Court does have the primary authority to declare treaties invalid,
it does not necessarily follow that the Court also has the authority to
declare resolutions of the Security Council and General Assembly
invalid. "Vertical" supremacy over the acts of sovereign states does not
necessarily imply "horizontal" supremacy over the acts of coequal
organs of the United Nations. 3 1 The former would appear to be crucial
to a U.N. system that strives for universal adherence to agreed prin-
ciples of international law. Judicial review of coequal organs might
serve important goals-eliminating confusion in the law and protect-
ing the rights of "minority states" 32-- but it is not as essential to the
establishment of a system of international law binding on individual
states.33
The Statute of the International Cofirt of Justice says no more about
judicial review than the U.N. Charter. Article 1 of the Statute em-
phasizes the Court's position as the "principal judicial organ" of the
United Nations. 34 The thirty remaining articles of Chapter I are
devoted to the organization of the Court: election of judges, duration
of terms, salary, and so forth. Chapter II, entitled "Competence of the
29. Some commentators have suggested that the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution
(art. VI, cl. 2), which by its terms applies to state officials, implies federal judicial power to
invalidate acts of Congress that violate the Constitution. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L REv. 1, 3-5 (1959); CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE
PEOPLE AND THE COURT 6 (1960). The more accepted view, however, is that the language of
the Supremacy Clause is "perfectly consistent with a view that treats congressional enactment as
conclusive of constitutionality." LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AmERICAN CONSTIITtriONAL.ILAW 24 n.4'
(2d ed. 1988) (citing ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 11-12 (1962)).
30. See supra note 23.
31. Commentators have reached much the same conclusion in the U.S. context. See, e.g.,
TRIBE, supra note 29, at 24 n.4; BICKEL, supra note 29, at 11-12.
32. See infra parts III-IV.
33. Indeed, U.S. courts have invalidated state statutes much more frequently than federal
laws. See TRIBE, supra note 29, at 13 n.7; CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELA-
TIONSHIP IN CoNsTriTTioNAL LAw 67-77 (1969). Some commentators have argued that judicial
review of federal statutes-the procedure authorized by Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137 (1803)-is less important than review of state statutes-the procedure authorized by Martin
v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (Story, J.). See TRIBE, supra note 29, at 13
n.7. Thus Holmes quipped: "I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost
our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the Union would be imperiled if we
could not make that declaration as to the laws of the several States." OUVER WENDELL HOLMES,
JR., COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 295-96 (1920).
34. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 1, 59 Stat. 1055,
1055, 3 Bevans 1179, 1179.
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Court," is largely concerned with jurisdiction. Article 34, for example,
provides that only states may be parties to contentious cases, and
article 36 describes the circumstances in which states may submit
themselves to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Statute says nothing
about judicial review.
In sum, the Charter and Statute do not clearly indicate whether the
Court has the power of judicial review and certainly do not indicate
how thorough such review might be. The texts are sufficiently "am-
biguous" to permit recourse to their travaux prparatoires-their ne-
gotiating history.
35
B. The Travaux Prparatoires of the Charter and Statute
The strongest argument that the World Court lacks the power of
judicial review stems from certain passages in the negotiating history
of the U.N. Charter. Judicial review is said to be impermissible
because Belgian proposals to permit such review were rejected by the
United Nations at the Conference on International Organization in
1945.36 This assertion merits closer examination.
1. The First Belgian Amendment
During the Conference, Belgium repeatedly suggested that the
World Court play a significant role in the peaceful settlement of
disputes. On February 5, 1945, in its suggestions on the Dumbarton
Oaks Proposals, 37 Belgium urged that whenever the Security Council
intervened to settle a dispute, its action should become "final" only
after the parties had an opportunity to "ask an advisory opinion from
the International Court of Justice as to whether the decision respected
its independence and vital rights."38 Later the Belgian delegation
developed this suggestion into a proposed amendment to the "Chapter
on Pacific Settlement of Disputes" in the draft U.N. Charter. The
amendment, the first of two formal proposals on interpretation even-
tually advanced by Belgium, provided:
35. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text (describing relevant rules of treaty
interpretation).
36. See, e.g., Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 168 (Advisory
Opinion of July 20) [hereinafter Certain Expenses Case] (noting that proposals to give the World
Court the last word in constitutional interpretation were "not accepted" during the drafting of
the Charter); FALK, supra note 10, at 162; Lissitzyn, supra note 10, at 51.
37. In the autumn of 1944 several of the Allied Powers gathered at Dumbarton Oaks, in
Washington, D.C., to develop general proposals for a new international organization to replace
the League of Nations. The resulting proposals, published on October 9, 1944, became the
basis for the U.N. Charter that was negotiated and adopted by the San Francisco Conference in
the late Spring of 1945. See generally LELAND M. GOODRICH, THE UNITED NATIONS IN A
CHANGING WORLD 40-45 (1974).
38. Doc. 2, G/7(k), 3 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 331, 332-33 (1945).
1993 / The World Court and Judicial Review
Any State, party to a dispute brought before the Security Council,
shall have the right to ask the Permanent Court of International
Justice whether a recommendation or a decision made by the
Council or proposed in it infringes on its essential rights. If the
Court considers that such rights have been disregarded or are
threatened, it is for the Council either to reconsider the question
or to refer the dispute to the Assembly for decision.
39
The Belgian delegate pressed this amendment at the seventh meeting
of the Committee on Peaceful Settlement 40 on May 19, 1945, arguing
that the amendment was necessary if the Security Council's power to
"recommend" solutions to disputes meant that a state "might be
obliged to abandon a right granted to it by positive international law
as an essential right of statehood. ""4 The purpose of the amendment,
the Belgian delegate reiterated, was to allow a state to seek an "advisory
opinion" from the World Court if that state believed that a Security
Council recommendation "infringed on its essential rights."42 The
Belgian delegate noted that the amendment merely provided that the
matter would be remanded to the Security Council or the General
Assembly after the Court's decision, indicating that the amendment
would not "limit" the powers of the Security Council, but rather
would "strengthen the juridical basis" of Security Council decisions.
43
Three states, all of which expected they would become permanent
members of the Security Council, 44 spoke against the Belgian amend-
ment. The Soviet delegate "felt that the Security Council should
receive the full confidence" of the members of the organization', and
that "[tjhere should be no question in the minds of any Delegates
that the Security Council might wish in any way to infringe the rights
of a sovereign state."45 The Belgian amendment, according to the
Soviet delegate, would "weaken" the Council, which might even be
made a "defendant before the Court." 46 The U.S. delegate noted that
the working drafts already required the Security Council to act "in
39. Doc. 2, G/7(k)(1), 3 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 335, 336 (1945).
40. The Committee was a subcommittee of the Commission on the Security Council, estab-
lished to prepare the relevant Charter provisions on that organ. See id.
41. Doc. 433, 11112/15, 12 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 47, 48 (1945). The Committee's report of
the ensuing debate is also set out in HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 446-
47 n.8 (1954).
42. Doc. 433, supra note 41, at 49.
43. Id.
44. The original framework for the Charter, the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, included as
permanent members of the Security Council the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet
Union, the Republic of China, and France. See Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, ch. VI, sec. A,
reprinted in LELAND M. GOODRICH ET AL., CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 667-68 (3d
ed. 1969).
45. Doc. 433, supra note 41, at 49.
46. Id.
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accordance with the purposes and principles of the Organization" and
"with due regard for principles of justice and international law."
47
Moreover, the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals already permitted states to
appeal "on any matter which might properly go before the Court."48
For both these reasons, the amendment was unnecessary. France ex-
pressed "sympathy" with the amendment, but argued it would be
ineffective, "especially since it involved a dispersal of responsibilities
in the Organization. "49 The French delegate suggested clarification of
the difference between Security Council recommendations and deci-
sions, and suggested that the subcommittee on drafting "endeavor to
give the most complete guarantees possible that the Security Council
accomplish its task according to law and justice."50
One state did speak in favor of the Belgian proposal. The delegate
of Colombia, a state that did not expect to be a permanent member
of the Security Council, argued that "confidence" in the Security
Council "should not exclude confidence in the International Court of
Justice." 5' The Colombian delegate, noting that the Dumbarton Oaks
Proposals provided that justiciable disputes should normally be re-
ferred to the Court, "suggested that no question was more eminently
legal than one concerning the essential rights of a state."
5 2
Three days later, at the final meeting on the Belgian proposal, three
more states spoke against the amendment. The delegate of the United
Kingdom, another future Council member, argued that the amend-
ment would involve the Court in political questions, not legal ones.
53
It would also, according to the British delegate, engender delay,
perhaps to the advantage of "a state contemplating aggression. "
4
Finally, the British delegate called for trust in the Security Council,
noting that a majority of its members would be composed of "small
states." 55 The South African delegate agreed with this last point,
adding that it was "fair to assume that decisions representing agree-
ment among the great powers would be reasonable" because they would
47. Id. Similar provisions became part of the final Charter. See U.N. CHARTER art. 24, para.
2 ("the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United
Nations"); id. art. 1, para. 1 (the United Nations, in fulfilling its purpose, shall act "in
conformity with the principles of justice and international law").
48. Doc. 433, supra note 41, at 49.
49. Id. at 50.
50. Id. The record, which consists of a summary of remarks of delegates, does not indicate
that any other state spoke against the amendment.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Doc. 498, 111/2/19, 12 U.N.C.I.O. Does. 65, 65 (1945). Much of the relevant report
is reprinted in KELSEN, supra note 41, at 447-48 n.8.
54. Doc. 498, supra note 53, at 65.
55. Id.
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be influenced by world opinion as well as by other states with which
they had "close relationships."
56
Finally the Belgian delegate asked whether the Security Council's
power to "recommend" a solution to disputes would bind the parties
to a dispute, or whether it was merely advisory. Having been informed
that the Council's power would be only advisory, the Belgian delegate
withdrew the amendment since "it now was clearly understood that a
recommendation made by the Council under [what is now Chapter
VII did not possess obligatory effect."
57
The withdrawal of the Belgian proposal can hardly be interpreted
as a determination by the framers that judicial review was unaccept-
able. Instead, it simply reflects Belgium's realization that judicial
review of Security Council recommendations taken under what is now
Chapter VI was unnecessary since those recommendations would not
be binding anyway. 58 Withdrawal of that proposal had nothing to do
with the acceptability of judicial review for binding Security Council
decisions, such as those taken pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter.
Although some of the comments of states opposed to the Belgian
amendment may reflect broader opposition to increased power for the
Court, no state went so far as to suggest that the Court should always
uphold acts of the Security Council, even those that are manifestly
ultra vires. Indeed, shortly thereafter the delegates to the U.N. Con-
ference made it clear that no U.N. organ-including the World Court
or the Security Council-is required to enforce another organ's decision
if it is not "generally acceptable."
2. The Second Belgian Amendment
Belgium later sponsored a second amendment. On May 29, 1945,
Belgium argued that the Committee on Legal Problems, a subset of
the Commission on Judicial Organization, "should determine the
proper interpretative organ for the several parts of the Charter."' 9
During debate, some delegations suggested that the General Assembly
was the proper organ. 60 Others preferred the Court, arguing that it
would rule objectively and promote "uniformity of jurisprudence. 
' 61
Still others argued for a "joint conference" or an ad hoc "committee
of experts" to resolve conflicts over interpretation, 62 and some states
thought that interpretation should be left to the organ most directly
56. Id. at 66.
57. Id.
58. See id.
59. Doc. 664, IV/2/33, 13 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 633, 633 (1945).
60. Id.
61. Id.; see also Doc. 843, IV/2/37, 13 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 645, 645 (1945).
62. Doc. 664, supra note 59, at 633.
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concerned. 63 Finally, some states argued it was unnecessary to insert
any provisions in the Charter on the question because "practice would
determine the method of interpretation. "' The absence of a formal
procedure would, it was said, preserve "flexibility.
'" 65
The new Belgian proposal did not prevail. The Committee even-
tually decided to "reject [Belgium's] suggestion of referring interpre-
tation disagreements on the Charter between organs to the Court as
an establishedprocedure."66 Instead, it resolved that member states should
be free to submit disputes to the Court, and that two disputing organs
could seek an advisory opinion from the Court, establish an ad hoc
committee of jurists, or resort to a joint conference. 67 A subcommittee
drafted a report finding it "inevitable that each organ will interpret
such parts of the Charter as are applicable to its particular functions"
and declaring it unnecessary to insert a provision in the Charter to
this effect. 68 The report continued:
Under unitary forms of national government the final determi-
nation of such a question may be vested in the highest court or
in some other national authority. However, the nature of the
Organization and its operation would not seem to be such as to
invite the inclusion in the Charter of any provision of this
nature.
69
Without elaborating on this point, the report encouraged states and
organs to bring disputes before the Court and endorsed the use of ad
hoc committees or joint conferences to settle disputes over interpre-
tation.70 The report concluded that if an interpretation by any organ
or committee "is not generally acceptable it will be without binding
force," in which case the report stated, the Charter should be amended
to resolve the conflict.
7 1
The defeat of the second Belgium proposal does suggest that the
framers did not wish the Charter to authorize judicial review "as an
established procedure." But the report on interpretation did not rule
63. Id. at 634.
64. Id.
65. Doc. 843, supra note 61, at 645.
66. Id. (emphasis added).
67. Id. at 646; see also Doc. 873, IV/2/37(1), 13 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 653, 653-54 (1945)
(slightly amended version of original report in the revised summary report of the 14th meeting).
68. Doc. 933, IV/2/42(2), 13 U.N.C.1.O. Docs. 703, 709 (1945). Essentially identical
earlier versions of this report can be found in WD 269, IV/2/42, 13 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 681,
687-88 (1945); Doc. 887, IV/2/39, 13 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 668, 668-69 (1945); and Doc. 750,
IV/2/1B/1, 13 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 831, 831-32 (1945).
69. Doc. 933, supra note 68, at 709.
70. See id. at 709-10.
71. Id. at 710.
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out judicial review altogether; it held instead that if an organ produced
an interpretation that was not "generally acceptable," it would be
"without binding force." 72 Plainly this statement implies that the
Court would not be required to give effect to a Security Council
decision based on an interpretation that was not "generally acceptable"
and therefore "without binding force." Moreover, the report clearly
stated that the Court might be called on to resolve disputes over
interpretation and implied that the Court's word would be final, at
least in that particular dispute and with respect to those parties .
3
The report suggested that each U.N. organ would interpret the
Charter in the course of its day-to-day affairs, and that interpretation
disputes might sometimes be resolved not only by the Court, but also
by ad hoc committees or joint conferences. 74 But such an arrangement
is hardly incompatible with judicial review. A number of states,
including the United States, possess a decentralized system of consti-
tutional development and interpretation in which dozens or hundreds
of entities---courts, legislatures, and executive departments--can con-
strue the Constitution.
A more difficult question is whether the Conference's report on
interpretation rejected the doctrine of judicial supremacy-the doc-
trine that the World Court's pronouncements on the meaning of the
Charter are binding on all states and all U.N. organs in all future
cases. That question is explored in greater detail in Part IV. For now,
suffice it to say that the institution of judicial review can exist without
a doctrine of judicial supremacy. It is conceivable that the World
Court's interpretation of the Charter in a dispute might be binding
only on the parties, including relevant organs, and only in that
particular case. 
5
One final aspect of the Conference report merits attention. By
directing the Court and other organs to disregard interpretations that
are not "generally acceptable," the framers implicitly endorsed a gen-
eral standard of review in "constitutional" cases. This standard of
review was, on its face, quite deferential. The report did not explain
precisely how the Court or other organ might determine that an organ's
interpretation of the Charter was "not generally acceptable." The term
implies that at least a majority of states, or perhaps a majority of
72. Id.
73. See id. at 709-10.
74. Id. at 709. The report also suggested that such disputes might be resolved by amendment
of the Charter. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. One problem with such a system is
that the Charter, like the U.S. Constitution, is not easily amended. Amendments must be
approved by two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified by two-thirds of
the members of the United Nations, including all five permanent members of the Security
Council. See U.N. CHARTER art. 108.
75. See infra part IV.
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U.N. organs or international jurists, would have to reject an inter-
pretation to leave it "without binding force." As the next Part sug-
gests, the Court itself has also developed a deferential standard of
review, but it relies on a somewhat different formulation-a "pre-
sumption" that the acts and interpretations of other organs are valid.
In sum, the text and negotiating history of the relevant U.N.
instruments do not rule out all forms of judicial review. Instead, they
suggest that any U.N. organ, including the Court, should ignore a
"generally unacceptable" interpretation of the Charter by another or-
gan. The next Part explores the evolution of the Court's own thinking
on the question of judicial review.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN
WORLD COURT PRACTICE
As we have seen, the text of the U.N. Charter does not directly
address the issue of whether the International Court of Justice may
invalidate resolutions of coequal organs of the United Nations.7 6 The
travaux prdparatoires of the Charter suggest that the framers may have
intended to withhold at least some powers of judicial review from the
International Court of Justice, but the law of treaties permits recourse
to more than just the text and travaux preparatoires of a treaty like the
U.N. Charter.7 Article 3 1(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties provides that interpretation should take into account "any
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation." Actual
exercise of judicial review by the World Court, it seems, would
constitute this sort of "subsequent practice." Indeed, states themselves
may have established a "subsequent practice" by their unanimous
acquiescence in the Court's de facto exercise of judicial review.
The Court has addressed the question of judicial review in three
major cases. They are considered below.
A. The Certain Expenses Case
In late 1961 the General Assembly requested an advisory opinion
from the Court on whether member states were responsible for expenses
relating to U.N. operations in the Congo in 1960-61 and in the
76. See supra part I.A.
77. See supra part I.B.
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Middle East in the late 1950s. 7 1 Article 17(2) of the U.N. Charter
provides that "[tihe expenses of the Organization shall be borne by
the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly." The legal
question posed by the General Assembly was whether expenses for the
Congo and Middle East operations were "expenses of the Organization"
within the meaning of article 17(2).7 9
At the outset of its opinion, the Court noted that the Assembly
had rejected a French amendment to the resolution requesting an
advisory opinion. The amendment would have asked the Court to
decide whether the expenditures were "decided on in conformity with
the provisions of the Charter"-that is, whether the Assembly and
the Security Council had acted ultra vires in authorizing the expendi-
tures-and only thereafter to consider whether the expenditures were
"expenses of the Organization" within article 17(2). s ° The Court stated
that rejection of the French amendment did not preclude it from
considering whether the expenditures were "decided on in conformity
with the provisions of the Charter, if the Court finds such consideration
appropriate."81 The Court added that it "must have full liberty to
consider all relevant data available to it in forming an opinion on a
question posed to it for an advisory opinion."82 Essentially, the Court
asserted a power of judicial review, even though the Assembly appar-
ently intended that the Court not do so.
Having made this assertion of authority, the Court went on to
undermine it. In upholding the Assembly and Council resolutions in
question, the Court said:
In the legal systems of States, there is often some procedure for
determining the validity of even a legislative or governmental
act, but no analogous procedure is to be found in the structure
of the United Nations. Proposals made during the drafting of the
Charter to place the ultimate authority to interpret the Charter in the
78. G.A. Res. 1731, U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 54, U.N. Doc. A15062
(1961). The operations had been authorized by resolutions of both the General Assembly and
the Security Council. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 1633, U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at
46, U.N. Doc. A/4943 (1961); G.A. Res. 1619, U.N. GAOR, -15th Sess., Supp. No. 16A,
at 14, U.N. Doc. A14740 (1961); G.A. Res. 1595, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16A,
at 13, U.N. Doc. A/4714 (1961), G.A. Res. 1590, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16,
at 57, U.N. Doc. A14658 (1960); G.A. Res. 1583, U.N. GAOR, 19th Sess., Supp. No. 16,
at 52, U.N. Doc. A14676 (1980); S.C. Res. 4387, U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 873d mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/4387 (1960); S.C. Res. 4405, U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 879th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/
4405 (1960); S.C. Res. 4426, U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 886th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/4426 (1960);
S.C. Res. 4741, U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 942d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/4741 (1960); S.C. Res.
5002, U.N. SCOR, 16th Sess., 982d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/5002 (1961).
79. See G.A. Res. 1731, supra note 78, at 54.
80. Certain Expenses Case, 1962 I.CJ. at 156.
81. Id. at 157.
82. Id.
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International Court of Justice were not accepted; the opinion
which the Court is in the course of rendering is an advisory
opinion. As anticipated in 1945, therefore, each organ must, in
the first place at least, determine its own jurisdiction.
3
This statement is sometimes cited as evidence that the Court be-
lieves it lacks a power of judicial review.8 4 Such a cramped reading of
the passage is unwarranted. The Court did not deny that it might
have some authority to interpret the Charter-only that it did not have
the ultimate authority to do so. It left open the possibility, in other
words, that its interpretation might be binding only on the parties
before it, just as its decisions in contentious cases are binding only on
the parties before it.8 5 If each organ must determine its own jurisdic-
tion "in the first place at least," it seems plausible that some other
organ might pass on jurisdictional questions after a political organ
makes a prima facie determination that it has jurisdiction to act.
Moreover, the Court stressed that this was an advisory opinion, in
which any decision of the Court-constitutional or otherwise-has
little or no binding force.
8 6
The Court gave other indications that it might consider exercising
a power of judicial review. In particular, the Court held that "when
the Organization takes action which warrants the assertion that it was
appropriate for the fulfillment of one of the stated purposes of the
United Nations, the presumption is that such action is not ultra
vires."s7 Presumptions can certainly be overcome. The Court's language
suggests that such a presumption might not apply to action that is
not "appropriate for the fulfillment of one of the stated purposes" of
the United Nations-that is, action that is "manifestly ultra vires."88
The Court seemed to imply, it might decline to give effect to such
an action.
In so doing, the Court quietly established its own standard of review
for "constitutional" cases. Without explaining its reasoning, the Court
transformed the "not generally acceptable" language of the travaux
preparatoires into legal language more familiar to lawyers-the language
83. Id. at 168 (emphasis added).
84. See, e.g., FALK, supra note 10, at 102.
85. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 59, 59 Stat. 1055,
1062, 3 Bevans 1179, 1190.
86. Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, 1950 I.C.J. 65,
71 (Advisory Opinion of Mar. 30). There is some authority to suggest that an advisory opinion
may bind the organ that requests it. See 1 GERALD FiTZMAURICE, THE LAW AND PROCEDURE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OFJUSTICE 123 (1986) (asserting that advisory opinions "cannot
be officially or formally questioned by the organ to which they are rendered," but noting that
the Court's opinions may be disregarded in actual practice).
87. Certain Expenses Case, 1962 I.C.J. at 168.
88. See Oseike, supra note 23, at 249.
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of presumptions. One plausible explanation of the Court's rejection of
the "acceptance" test may be that it smacked too much of a political
popularity contest, while a "presumption" standard fit more comfort-
ably with the Court's role as "principal judicial organ" of the United
Nations. Whatever its origin, the "presumption of validity" has re-
tained its vitality as the Court's standard of review. 9
Writing separately, several Judges of the Court asserted that the
Court retained some power of judicial review. In his separate concur-
ring opinion, for example, Judge Morelli argued that it was necessary
to examine the validity of the resolutions establishing the Emergency
Force in the Middle East as well as those authorizing the operations
in the Congo. 90 In his view, the case raised "the rather delicate problem
of the validity of the acts of the United Nations," a problem that he
felt could not be avoided.V' Judge Morelli argued that the Court's
power of review should be a narrow one since the effectiveness of acts
of the political organs would otherwise be "laid open to perpetual
uncertainty. '92 His proposed standard of review was very deferential:
It is only in especially serious cases that an act of the Organization
could be regarded as invalid, and hence an absolute nullity.
Examples might be a resolution which had not obtained the
required majority, or a resolution vitiated by a manifest excds de
pouvoir (such as, in particular, a resolution the subject of which
had nothing to do with the purposes of the Organization). 93
In 1962, in sum, the Court apparently envisioned a limited power
of judicial review for itself. But rather than adopt the test implicitly
proposed by the drafters-that an organ's act be "without binding
force" if "not generally acceptable"-the Court endorsed a more "legal"
standard: a presumption of validity. Hints of ambivalence about the
Court's power to exercise judicial review resurfaced a decade later in
the Namibia Case.
B. The Namibia Case
Following World War I, the League of Nations authorized South
Africa to administer a Mandate for Namibia, then known as South-
West Africa. Like any Mandatory power, South Africa was to act for
the benefit of the people of South-West Africa, to promote their "well-
being and development," and to behave in accordance with the "sacred
89. See infra part II.B-C (noting that the presumption reappeared in later cases).
90. Certain Expenses Case, 1962 I.C.J. at 221 (Morelli, J., concurring).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 223.
93. Id.
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trust" envisioned by the League of Nations system. 94 The League
collapsed after World War II, but South Africa continued its presence
in South-West Africa, maintaining a system of apartheid there. South
Africa defended this system by arguing it was no longer bound by the
terms of the Mandate since the League was defunct. 95 In 1950, how-
ever, the World Court held that the supervisory responsibilities im-
posed by the Mandate survived as part of the new U.N. trusteeship
system and that South Africa's policy of racial discrimination in South-
West Africa violated those responsibilities.
96
South Africa nonetheless continued its policy of apartheid in South-
West Africa, which led the General Assembly to declare in 1966 that
South Africa had violated the Mandate, that the Mandate was therefore
terminated, and that "South Africa [had] no other right to administer
the Territory."97 The Security Council followed suit, declaring South
Africa's continued presence in South-West Africa illegal, recognizing
that the General Assembly would assume responsibility for the Ter-
ritory, and calling upon South Africa to withdraw. 98 When South
Africa refused to comply, the Security Council asked the International
Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on the legal consequences of
South Africa's continued presence in South-West Africa, now known
as Namibia. 99
In its opinion, the Court repeatedly considered the validity of both
the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. The Court
first rejected South Africa's argument that the Security Council reso-
lution seeking an advisory opinion was procedurally invalid because
two permanent members abstained and therefore did not cast "con-
curring votes" as required by the Charter.100 Reiterating its previous
statements that resolutions of U.N. organs are entitled to a presump-
94. See South-West Africs (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Ar.), 1962 I.C.J. 319, 329
(Preliminary Objections, Judgment of Dec. 21) (summarizing the purposes of the Mandate
system).
95. See International Status of South-West Africa, 1950 I.C.J. 127, 133 (Advisory Opinion
of July 11); Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16,
33 (Advisory Opinion of June 21) (noting that South Africa renewed this argument in the 1971
case) [hereinafter Namibia Case).
96. "Since [the Mandate's) fulfillment did not depend on the existence of the League of
Nations, it could not be brought to an end merely because this supervisory organ ceased to
exist." International Status of South-West Africa, 1950 I.C.J. at 133.
97. G.A. Res. 2145, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, para. 4, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/
6316 (1966).
98. S.C. Res. 264, U.N. SCOR, 24th Sess., at 1, U.N. Doc. SIINF/24/Rev. 1 (1969). See
also S.C. Res. 269, U.N. SCOR, 24th Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. S/INF/24/Rev. 1 (1969); S.C.
Res. 276, U.N. SCOR, 25th Sess., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/INF/25 (1970); S.C. Res. 283, U.N.
SCOR, 25th Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. S/INF/25 (1970) (reaffirming earlier resolution).
99. S.C. Res. 284, U.N. SCOR, 25th Sess., 1550th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/284 (1970).
100. See Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 21-22.
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tion of validity, the Court held that the Council's "general practice"
was to treat an abstention as a concurring vote, and thus that the
resolution was validly adopted.I0 1 The Court also rejected arguments
that the resolution was invalid because South Africa was not invited
to participate in the debate and because "parties" to the "dispute" did
not abstain from voting. 1
0 2
Turning to the merits, the Court described South Africa's renewed
argument that it was not bound by the Mandate after World War
11103 and South Africa's alternative argument that it had a continued
right to administer the Territory because it had conquered Namibia,
had acquired sovereignty over the Territory by virtue of lengthy oc-
cupation, had in fact pursued the "sacred trust" established by the'
Mandate, and had benefited the inhabitants of the Territory. 1°4 The
Court then noted that the General Assembly and Security Council had
issued resolutions negating all of these arguments. 0 5 The Court ob-
served that both France and South Africa had argued that the General
Assembly had acted ultra vires in adopting its resolution purporting
to terminate the Mandate for Namibia and declaring South Africa's
presence illegal. 10 6 This argument, the Court noted, also called into
question the validity of related Security Council resolutions. 10 7 Pre-
sented with its own Marbury v. Madison, the Court decided to consider
the validity of the resolutions stating equivocally:
Undoubtedly, the Court does not possess powers of judicial review
or appeal in respect of the decisions taken by the United Nations
organs concerned. The question of the validity or conformity with
the Charter of General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) or of
related Security Council resolutions does not form the subject of
the request for advisory opinion. However, in the exercise of its
judicial function and since objections have been advanced the
Court, in the course of its reasoning, will consider these objections before
determining any legal consequences arising from those
resolutions. 108
The Court went on to pass explicitly on the validity of the acts in
question, holding that the General Assembly did in fact have the
101. Id. at 22.
102. Id. at 22-23. The Court also denied South Africa's request for the appointment of a
Judge ad hoc. Id. at 23-27.
103. Id. at 35-43; see supra text accompanying note 95.
104. Id. at 43-45.
105. Id. at 45.
106. Id.
107. See id.
108. Id. (emphasis added).
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power to terminate the Mandate' 09 and did not overstep the boundaries
of its authority by declaring South Africa's presence illegal. 11° The
Court also held that even though the Assembly has no power to make
binding decisions, I1' the Assembly could adopt resolutions that "make
determinations or have operative design," such as the resolution de-
claring that South Africa had no residual right to administer Namibia
by virtue of conquest or long occupation. 112 Finally, the Court held
that the Security Council resolutions endorsing the Assembly's actions
were in accordance with the Charter. 113 Concluding that South Africa's
conduct did not comply with the Council's resolutions, the Court
noted that other states were also bound by the Council's resolutions
and were therefore required to abstain from recognizing South Africa's
occupation of Namibia. 114 In rendering this decision, the Court plainly
considered the validity of the acts of other U.N. organs--a practice
inconsistent with the view that the Court has no power of review.
Several concurring Judges argued more explicitly than the majority
that the Court not only had the right, but also the responsibility, to
review the validity of the acts in question. Judge Petren, for example,
declared that "[slo long as the validity of the resolutions upon which
Resolution 276 (1970) was based had not been established, it was
clearly impossible for the Court to pronounce on [its] legal conse-
quences," and noted that it seemed to him the majority should have
expressed itself on that point more precisely and firmly."115 Similarly,
Judge Onyeama argued that the Court could not determine the legal
consequences of the resolutions without first passing on their validity
and that the Court, in fact, had a duty to do so unless otherwise
instructed in the request for an advisory opinion.116 Judge Dillard,
too, argued that the Court had no choice but to inquire into the
validity of the resolutions once asked to pass on their legal conse-
quences. He underscored his point with surprising bluntness:
[I]t may not be presumptuous to suggest that as a political matter
it is not in the long-range interest of the United Nations to
appear to be reluctant to have its resolutions stand the test of
legal validity when it calls upon a court to determine issues to
which this validity is related. 117
109. Id. at 45-49.
110. Id. at 49-50.
111. See U.N. CHARTER art. 10.
112. Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 50.
113. Id. at 51-53.
114. Id. at 54-58.
115. Id. at 131 (Petren, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 143-45 (Onyeama, J., concurring).
117. Id. at 151-52 (Dillard, J., concurring).
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Judge de Castro, concurring, observed that "[t]he Court, as a legal
organ, cannot co-operate with a resolution which is clearly void,
contrary to the rules of the Charter, or contrary to the principles of
law."'118 Finally, Judge Fitzmaurice, dissenting, directly attacked the
validity of the Council and Assembly resolutions as beyond the com-
petence of those bodies, 119 asserting that the Court had the right to
"examine the assumptions" underlying any request for an advisory
opinion. 120
At least one concurring judge, however, expressed opposition to a
doctrine of judicial review. Judge Nervo, writing separately, asserted
that "the Court will have to assume the validity" of the actions of the
Council and Assembly and that "Itihe Court should not assume powers
of judicial review of the action of principal organs of the United
Nations without specific request to that effect."1 2 1 Yet even this state-
ment left room for judicial review at the request of another organ.
This chorus of support for judicial review in the Namibia Case may
have had only limited precedential value. Like the Certain Expenses
Case, Namibia was an advisory opinion with little or no binding
effect 2 2 -though there is some authority to suggest an advisory opin-
ion may bind the U.N. organ in question. 123 The Namibia opinion
reflects a common-sense view that once the Court is asked about the
effect of a U.N. organ's resolution, it cannot avoid considering whether
the resolution is valid in the first place. Indeed, one Judge stressed
that when the Security Council debated whether to submit the issue
to the Court, only five Council members expressed the view that the
Court should not pass on the validity of the resolutions, while ten
members either took the opposite view or took no position at all. 124
The Namibia advisory opinion did not necessarily imply that the
Court would exercise judicial review in a contentious case. Contentious
cases are distinguishable from advisory opinions because the requested
inquiry into a U.N. organ in a contentious case comes from an
individual state rather than from the organ itself. In advisory cases,
118. Id. at 180 (de Castro, J., concurring); see also id. at 180 n.2 (quoting Certain Expenses
Case, 1962 I.C.J. 216, at 223 (Morelli, J., concurring)).
119. Id. at 278-95 (Fitzmaurice, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 301-04.
121. Id. at 105 (Nervo, J., concurring). Judge Anmoun, also writing separately, did not
explicitly address the question of judicial review. See id. at 67-100 (Ammoun, J., concurring).
122. Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations,
1950 I.C.J. 4, 78 (Advisory Opinion of Mar. 3).
123. See FRtzi LUCE, supra note 86, at 123.
124. Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 151. (Dillard, J., concurring). One wonders whether the
Court would have considered the validity of the resolutions had it been expressly instructed not
to do so. The Certain Expenses opinion, which exercised a power of review notwithstanding the
Assembly's apparent opposition, suggests that the Court might have considered the validity of
the resolutions anyway.
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the U.N. organ understands it might be second-guessed when it
submits a question to the Court for resolution. In contentious cases,
by contrast, the organ's acts are challenged without its consent. This
difference was a possible basis for limiting the scope of the Namibia
opinion--at least until Libya v. United States. 
125
C. Libya v. United States
On December 21, 1988, a bomb planted on Pan Am flight 103
exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing all 258 people on board
and at least fifteen people on the ground. 126 Subsequent evidence
linked two Libyan intelligence agents to the sabotage. In late 1991,
the United States and the United Kingdom indicted the suspects and
requested their extradition. 127 Libya refused, asserting it was investi-
gating the charges and, if necessary, would try its nationals itself.128
Libya also asked the United States and the United Kingdom for
evidence to assist in the Libyan investigation. 129
On January 21, 1992, the Security Council unanimously adopted
resolution 731, which criticized Libya for failing to respond effectively
to the extradition requests and "urge[d]" Libya to "provide a full and
effective response to those requests." 130 In response, Libya informed
the Secretary-General on February 27 that it had "no objection in
principle" to handing over the two subjects, but would do so only if
the Secretary-General established a committee of impartial judges to
inquire into the charges against the two suspects, and only if the
suspects were extradited to a "third party." 131 On March 2, Libya
further explained its failure to extradite by noting that "Libyan law
which [had] been in force for more than 30 years does not permit the
125. Libya v. United States, 1992 I.CJ. 114.
126. See Edward Cody, Pan Am jet Crashes in Scotland, Killing at Least 273, WASH. POST,
Dec. 22, 1988, at Al.
127. See Joint Declaration of the U.S. and U.K., Nov. 27, 1991, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 723
(1992) (demanding extradition).
128. See Letter from Ali Ahmed Elhoudeiri, Libyan Permanent Rep. to the U.N., to the
Secretary-General, (Jan, 8, 1992) reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 725, 726 (1992).
129. Id' at 726.
130. S.C. Res. 731, supra note 6, at 2. Interestingly, all parties to the dispute, even Libya,
seem to have assumed that the resolution amounts to an order that Libya should extradite the
fugitives. Yet the resolution merely "urges" Libya to provide a "full and effective" response; it
does not "demand" or "call on" Libya to "extradite" the two men. Cf. S.C. Res. 660, supra note
1, at 19 ("[d]emand[ing]" that Iraq withdraw from Kuwait). The stronger language of Security
Council Resolution 748, which imposed economic sanctions on Libya, may have made this point
moot. But even Resolution 748 is ambiguous. It "[d]ecides" that Libya "must now comply
without any further delay with paragraph 3 of Resolution 731," which itself merely urged Libya
to provide an "effective response." See S.C. Res. 748, supra note 2, at 2.
131. Letter from Ibrahim M. Bishari, Secretary of the People's Comm. for Foreign Liason
and Int'l Cooperation, to the Secretary-General, (Feb. 27, 1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 737,
737-38 (1992).
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extradition of Libyan nationals." 132 Libya argued that such a law
"cannot be altered by a decision of the Security Council, whether a
recommendation or a binding resolution.
" 133
The next day, March 3, Libya filed suit against the United States
in the World Court 134 seeking a judgment that U.S. efforts to obtain
custody of the fugitives violated the Montreal Convention on aircraft
sabotage, which provides that a requested state may choose either to
extradite a fugitive charged with sabotage or submit that person to
its own authorities for prosecution. 135 Libya also sought an order
"indicating provisional measures"-that is, an order temporarily re-
straining the United States from taking any further steps against Libya,
such as the imposition of economic sanctions. 136 On March 31, while
Libya's suit was pending, the Security Council adopted Resolution
748, which imposed sanctions on Libya effective April 15, including
132. Letter from Ibrahim M. Bishari, Secretary of the People's Comm. for Foreign Liason
and Int'l Cooperation, to the Secretary-General, (Mar. 2, 1992), reprin(ed in 31 I.L.M. 739, 740
(1992).
133. Id. The Libyan law prohibiting extradition of Libyan nationals appears to be statutory,
not constitutional asin some civil-law states. The Libyan "Constitutional Proclamation" of 1969
prohibits the extradition of "political refugees," but not Libyan nationals. Constitutional Pro-
clamation of the Revolutionary Command Council, Dec. 11, 1969, art. 11, reprinted in 9
ALBERT P. BLAusTEIN & GISBERT H. FLANZ, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD 3 (1974).
Moreover, the 1969 Declaration may have been at least partly supplanted by Islamic law. See
id. at 2 (1981 supplement) (noting that Col. Qaddafi has since declared that the "Holy Kuran
is the constitution" of Libya); MuAaswAR .L-QADDAFi, THE GREEN BOOK 32 (1980) (asserting
that "law . . . is an eternal human heritage" and "drafting of a constitution .. . [on law] is
farcical"). Traditional Islamic law has little to say about extradition of nationals. See generally
THE IsLAMic CRIMINAL JUSTicE SYSTEM (M. CherifBassiouni ed., 1982). For a recent discussion
of Libyan law, see HELEN CHAPN METZ, LIBYA: A COUNTRY STUDY 192-98, 212-16 (1989).
134. See Libya v. United States, 1992 I.C.J. 114. Libya filed a similar suit against the United
Kingdom. See Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention
arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K.), 1992 I.C.J. 3 (Provisional
Measures Order of Apr. 14).
135. See Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civilian
AirCraft, Sept. 23, 1971, art. 7, 24 U.S.T. 564, 571, 974 U.N.T.S. 177, 182 thereinafter
"the Montreal Convention"].
Libya also argued that the U.S. position violated article 8 of the Montreal Convention, which
permits the requested state to refuse extradition if there is no relevant bilateral extradition treaty
in force and if the requested state's law conditions extradition on the existence of an extradition
treaty. See Libya v. United States, 1992 1.C.J. at 116. It is not entirely clear from the record,
however, that Libyan law does condition extradition on the existence of an extradition treaty.
Libya further argued that the United States had violated article 11 of the Montreal Convention,
which calls on states party to provide legal assistance to states prosecuting saboteurs. In addition,
Libya argued that the United States had violated article 5, which authorizes states to establish
jurisdiction over saboteurs, by interfering with Libya's ability to prosecute the offenders. Id. at
116-17.
The Court declined to ruls on any of Libya's claims under the Montreal Convention on the
ground that they were superseded by the Security Council resolutions calling for extradition of
the two suspects. See id. at 126-27.
136. Id. at 118-19.
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the cessation of all air travel to Libya and the withdrawal of diplomatic
personnel. 137
On April 14, 1992, the World Court handed down its decision on
Libya's request for preliminary relief, rejecting the application by a
vote of eleven to five. 138 The majority declined to rule on the U.S.
cortention that the Court lacked jurisdiction because the Montreal
Convention called for a six-month delay before submission of a dispute
to the Court, 139 concluding it could rule on the application for the
indication of provisional measures without deciding whether it had
jurisdiction to hear the merits. 140 The majority then held that Libya
was not entitled to provisional relief. Stressing article 103 of the U.N.
Charter, which provides that obligations under the Charter prevail
over treaty obligations such as those in the Montreal Convention, the
Court held that "[wihatever the situation previous to the adoption of
[Security Council Resolution 748], the rights claimed by Libya under
the Montreal Convention cannot now be regarded as appropriate for
protection by the indication of provisional measures." '14' The Court
137. See S.C. Res. 748, supra note 2.
138. Libya v. United States, 1992 I.C.J. at 114.
139. Id. at 122 (citing art. 14, para. 1 of the Montreal Convention).
140. Libya v. United States, 1992 I.C.J. at 127.
In fact, the United States had a fairly strong argument that Libya's suit was premature and
jurisdiction was lacking. Article 14(1) of the Montreal Convention provides:
Any dispute between two or more Contracting States concerning the interpretation or
application of this Convention which cannot be settled through negotiation, shall, at the
request of one of them, be submitted to arbitration. If within six months of the date of the
request for arbitration the Parties are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration,
any one of those Parties may refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice in
conformity with the Statute of the Court (emphasis added).
The United States argued that it had not "refused to arbitrate" within the meaning of the
clause and that the six-month period was a waiting period that had not yet expired. Libya v.
United States, 1992 I.C.J. at 122. Libya asserted that it had requested arbitration and that the
United States had rejected its request. It is not clear from the opinion whether Libya construed
the six-month period as contemplating that a suit be initiated no later than six months after the
request for arbitration. Id. at 121.
The plain meaning of the term "within" would appear to support such an interpretation:
"within six months" would normally mean "during the next six months." But the context of
the provision may support the U.S. view. Its purpose may have been to require the parties to
spend a minimum of six months attempting to negotiate a solution-a purpose in accordance
with the United Nations's preference for peaceful resolution of disputes. See generally U.N.
CHARTER arts. 33-38 (endorsing pacific settlement of disputes). A requirement that suit be
filed no later than six months after the initial request for arbitration would not encourage a
negotiated settlement.
The Court may have been moved by Libya's suggestion that the "urgency" of the matter
conferred jurisdiction. Libya v. United States, 1992 I.C.J. at 121. The six-month waiting period
invoked by the United States struck Acting President Oda, and perhaps other Judges, as "too
legalistic." Id. at 129 (Oda, J., concurring). As Judge Oda put it, the Court's jurisprudence
permits it to take jurisdiction over an application for provisional relief if "the Court appears
prima facie to possess jurisdiction." Id.
141. Libya v. United States, 1992 I.C.J. at 126-27.
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added that the indication of provisional measures would "be likely to
impair" U.S. rights under the Council resolution. 142
The majority opinion thus relied on the Council resolution without
addressing whether it might be ultra vires. Nonetheless, the majority
left room for Libya to argue in future pleadings that the Council had
violated a fundamental principle of general international law, rather
than a "mere" treaty like the Montreal Convention. Article 103, relied
on so heavily by the majority, provides that Charter obligations prevail
over "other international agreements"; it does not provide that Charter
obligations prevail over jus cogens and other forms of customary inter-
national law. 143
The brief majority opinion reveals less about the Court's thinking
than the separate opinions of individual Judges. Several of the Judges
were satisfied that the Security Council resolutions were controlling;
these Judges apparently saw no need to inquire into the validity of
the Council's acts. Judges Evensen, Tarassov, Guillaume and Aguilar
Mawdsley signed an opinion that endorsed the reasoning of the ma-
jority opinion without exploring the Charter basis for the Council's
resolutions. Acting President Oda, too, asserted in his concurring
opinion that the Security Council resolution was dispositive. 144 But
even he hinted that the Court might have to exercise a power of
judicial review if a state argued that the Council had deprived it of
"sovereign rights" under general international law. 145
Several Judges, moreover, felt obliged to clarify their belief that
the rejection of Libya's application for provisional relief did not imply
that the Court was "abdicatfing]" its role as the chief judicial organ
of the United Nations. 146 Judge Lachs accepted the majority's reason-
ing, but called for cooperation between the Court and the Council,
noting that these are the only two U.N. organs with authority to
issue binding decisions. 147 Judge Ni, concurring in the result, accepted
the U.S. argument that the Court lacked jurisdiction until the expi-
ration of the six-month period established in the Montreal Conven-
tion. 1 4  In dictum, however, he argued that once jurisdiction was
established, the Court should not shrink from considering -the case
simply because the matter was also pending before the Security
Council. 149
142. Id. at 127.
143. See Thomas M. Franck, The "Powers of Appreciation": Who Is the Ultimate Guardian of UN
Legality?, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 519, 521-22 (1992).
144. Libya v. United States, 1992 I.C.J. at 129-31 (Oda, J., concurring).
145. Id. at 131 (Oda, J., concurring); see Franck, supra note 143, at 521-22.
146. Libya v. United States, 1992 I.C.J. at 138-39 (Lachs, J., concurring).
147. Id. at 139.
148. Id. at 134-35 (Ni, J., concurring).
149. Id. at 132-34.
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A number of other Judges believed the Court should at least consider
whether the Council's acts were valid. Citing the Namibia Case, Judge
Shahabuddeen concluded that the Council resolution at issue was
entitled to a presumption of validity. 150 Relying on this presumption,
and mindful of the preliminary procedural posture of the case, he
concurred in the majority opinion but clearly implied that the Court
should have some role in enforcing the limits of Security Council
power:
In the equilibrium of forces underpinning the structure of the
United Nations within the evolving international order, is there
any conceivable point beyond which a legal issue may properly
arise as to the competence of the Security Council to produce such
overriding results? If there are any limits, what are those limits
and what body, if other than the Security Council, is competent
to say what those limits are? 151
Judge Bedjaoui expressed similar reservations, also conceding that the
Council resolution imposing sanctions on Libya was entitled to a
presumption of validity, particularly because the case had not yet
reached the merits phase. 152 Judge Bedjaoui added, however, that even
at the preliminary stage of the suit the resolution should not be
considered prima facie binding if its "object" or "effect" was "to prevent
the exercise, by the Court itself, of the judicial function."153 Judge
Ajibola staked out a similar position, conceding that the resolution
was prima facie valid but reserving fuller consideration of its validity
for the merits phase.15 4 Judge Weeramantry echoed this view, noting
that the framers clearly intended the Security Council to operate in
accordance with the Charter. 55 He seemed less certain, however, that
the Court should play any role in reviewing Council acts. Citing the
Namibia Case, he asserted that the Court "is not vested with the review
or appellate jurisdiction often given to the highest courts within a
domestic framework," 156 but also added that "Ithe interpretation of
150. Id. at 140 (Shahabuddeen, J., concurring) (citing the Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 22).
151. Id. at 142.
152. Id. at 156 (Bedjaoui, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 156 n. 1. Judge Bedjaoui dissented not because he thought the Council resolution
was prima facie invalid-though he clearly had doubts on that score-but because he thought
the Court could indicate provisional measures other than those requested by Libya. Id. at 158.
In particular, he argued that the Court could order both parties to refrain from any action that
might extend or aggravate the dispute. Id.
154. Id. at 192-93, 196 (Ajibola, J., dissenting). Like Judge Bedjaoui, Judge Ajibola
dissented because he believed the Court could nonetheless order the parties to refrain from
aggravating the dispute. Id. at 198.
155. Id. at 174-75 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 165.
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Charter provisions is primarily a matter of law . . . .[I]n the
international arena, there is no higher body charged with judicial
functions and with the determination of questions of interpretation
and application of international law."
1 5 7
Only Judge EI-Kosheri, the ad hoc Judge named by Libya, went
so far as to declare invalid the Security Council's resolution imposing
sanctions. First, he asserted that states had the right to disobey Council
resolutions lacking a basis in the Charter, since article 25 provided
that states agree to obey Council decisions "in accordance with the
present Charter." 158 Next, Judge EI-Kosheri argued that the Court
had the power to invalidate Council acts inconsistent with the Charter.
Citing a number of the opinions in the Namibia Case, as well as Judge
Morelli's argument for judicial review in the Certain Expenses Case for
support, 15 9 Judge EI-Kosheri concluded that the Council resolution
imposing sanctions was ultra vires because it violated Libya's rights of
"sovereignty" under the Charter. 160 He relied in particular on article
1(2) and article 55 of the Charter, which speak of "equal rights and
self-determination" of peoples, as well as article 2(7), which forbids
the United Nations to "intervene in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state .... ',161 Judge El-
Kosheri added that he would have indicated two provisional measures:
that neither party aggravate the dispute, and that pending a final
decision of the Court, the fugitives be transferred to a third state "that
could ultimately provide a mutually agreed and appropriate forum for
their trial."
162
In sum, the Libya decision marked the first time a significant portion
of the World Court intimated it could exercise a power of judicial
review in contentious cases. This development is important not simply
because a contentious case has arguably greater precedential value than
an advisory case; it also suggests that the Court does not think judicial
review should be exercised only when implicitly or explicitly endorsed
by a U.N. organ seeking an advisory opinion on the effect of that
organ's acts. The decision implies that the international community
is moving toward a broader acceptance of judicial review than the
framers of the U.N. Charter perhaps envisioned-that subsequent
practice under the Charter may have altered its interpretation. Such a
shift is permissible under treaty law, at least if the world community
157. Id. at 166.
158. Id. at 206-07 (EI-Kosheri, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 207-10; see supra text accompanying notes 90-93.
160. Libya v. United States, 1992 I.C.J. at 210-12.
161. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7; see Libya v. United States, 1992 I.C.J. at 211.
162. Libya v. United States, 1992 I.C.J. at 217.
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acquiesces, 163 and this aspect of the Libya decision has not been widely
rejected by states as of yet.16
But even if the Libya Court has impliedly recognized a power of
judicial review, it has not adopted a very stringent standard. Many of
the opinions in Libya v. United States reaffirm the "presumption of
validity" established by the Certain Expenses and Namibia Cases, a very
deferential standard of review. More importantly, the Libya Court did
not go so far as to endorse a doctrine of judicial supremacy. While it
suggested it might review the validity of the acts of other organs in
a particular case, it did not hold that its interpretation of the Charter
would be final and binding on all states and all U.N. organs in the
future. The next Part explores the appropriate standard for review and
the effect (if any) of invalidation of a Council or Assembly resolution,
with reference to U.S. constitutional practice. First, however, that
Part considers whether the Court should exercise any power of judicial
review at all, again with reference to the United States, a state with
a well-established practice of judicial review.
III. THE LEAST DANGEROUS U.N. ORGAN?
In the United States, judicial review is considered suspect for many
reasons. Judges are unelected, unaccountable, and uncontrollable. The
legislative and executive branches are more directly responsible to the
people, and their decisions have a democratic imprimatur lacking in
court decisions. 165 Decisions of legislators and executive branch officials
can be overturned through the political process; decisions of consti-
tutional courts are practically impossible to overturn, protected from
attack except by the extraordinarily difficult process of constitutional
amendment. 166 Judicial efforts to interpret the text of a constitution,
even if sincere, are likely to fail since most constitutional questions
are not as easily resolved as early American advocates of judicial review
163. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31, para. 3(b), 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 340.
164. World reaction has focused more on the U.N. sanctions than on the Court's decision
itself. See, e.g., R.C. Longworth, A New World View: Bush's Status Abroad Has Suffered in a Year,
CHI. TRIB., June 21, 1992, at C1 (noting that Arab states "chafe" at the Libya sanctions).
165. See Jan G. Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections Between
Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REV. 169, 185-87 (1968).
166. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. V (establishing amendment process). The permanence of consti-
tutional decisions has persuaded the Supreme Court that the doctrine of stare deciis should be
applied less stringently in constitutional cases. See Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S.
62, 78 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 543 (1962)
(Harlan, J., plurality opinion)). But cf. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct.
2791, 2808-16 (1992) (emphasizing stare decisis while reaffirming Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973)).
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believed they would be. 167 Legal reasoning is often a flimsy disguise
for the politics of power; force and will, not judgment, frequently
characterize constitutional decisionmaking. 168 Judicial review should,
at most, merely ensure that statutes are not adopted by an unrepre-
sentative democratic process.169
Defenders of judicial review in the United States have ready re-
sponses to these criticisms. In their view, the assertedly undemocratic
character of courts is exaggerated: judges are appointed and confirmed
by elected officials, and the "federal judiciary may be more capable of
adapting to changes in the political consensus than the notion of an
independent judiciary would immediately suggest." 70 The decisions
of judges also derive legitimacy from the democratic character of the
document they interpret, the Constitution, which was adopted by the
people.' 7 ' If the undemocratic, conniving judge is an inaccurate car-
icature, so too is the democratic, noble legislator: the Congress re-
sponds only imperfectly to the people's will, as Congress's consistently
low approval ratings suggest. 172 Even the permanence of constitutional
decisions is overstated; the Constitution has been amended four times
to overrule Supreme Court decisions, 173 and the Court itself has over-
ruled its own decisions on a number of occasions. 174 Judicial review,
167. CompareJoiN HART ELY, DEMOcRACY AND DismusT 11-41 (discussing the "Impos-
sibility of a Clause-Bound Interpretivism") (1980) with THE FEDERAUST No. 78, at 398
(Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloff Blackwell ed., 1987) (presuming there will be an "irrecon-
cilable variance" between the Constitution and unconstitutional statutes).
168. Cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 167, at 399 (arguing that judges should adhere
to "judgment," not "will").
169. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 167, at 181 (arguing that judicial review "can appropriately
concern itself only with questions of participation, and not with the substantive merits of the
political choice under attack").
170. TIuNE, supra note 29, §§ 3-6, at 64. Pointing to the political nature of the appointment
process and to the ability to override judicial interpretation by constitutional amendment, Tribe
says the "[clourt's power to move beyond a current consensus is circumscribed by its institutional
incapacity to lead where others are reluctant to follow." Id. Moreover, the power of constitutional
interpretation is not vested in the judiciary alone; it is exercised by all three branches of
government. See id. at 66.
171. Cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 167, at 398 (arguing that in cases of conflict
between "the will of the legislature" expressed in a statute and the "that of the people" declared
in the Constitution, "the judges ought to be governed by the latter").
172. See, e.g., Robert Shogan, GOP Scrambles to Shore tip Sinking Support, L.A. TimEs, Aug.
19, 1992, at Al (describing "public disgust" with Congress); Lou Cannon, Washington State
Activists See Approval of Sweeping Initiative on Term Limits, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 1991, at A4
(describing popular measure to limit the terms of members of Congress).
173. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI (restricting the application of Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S.
(2 Dall.) 419 (1793), to forbid certain suits against states in federal court); id. amend. XIV,
§ 1 (overruling Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857)); id. amend. XVI (overruling
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), which invalidated unapportioned
federal income tax); id. amend. XXVI (overruling Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970),
which held that Congress could not set the minimum voting age in state elections).
174. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985)
(overruling Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)); Brown v. Board of Ed., 347
U.S. 497 (1954) (overruling Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)).
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moreover, serves an important "checking" function: it polices the
democratic process and protects minorities from invidious discrimi-
nation. 175 It also serves an important "legitimating" function: it "im-
print[s] governmental action with the stamp of legitimacy"t 6-the
stamp of constitutional approval. In addition, it may provide "cues"
to the other branches of government, which must routinely assess the
constitutionality of their- own acts. 177
The traditional arguments for and against judicial review take on a
different shape in the international sphere. This Part evaluates the
arguments most relevant to the prospect of judicial review by the
World Court-the anti-majoritarian problem and related questions of
institutional legitimacy, and special problems posed by interpretation
of the U.N. Charter.
A. The Anti-Majoritarian Problem
The anti-majoritarian problem-that is, the legitimacy of unelected
judges-seems, on balance, less pronounced in the international sys-
tem than in the U.S. legal system, though it is still a significant
concern. Unlike U.S. Supreme Court justices, World Court judges
are indeed elected, albeit by the Security Council and General Assem-
bly rather than by popular ballot. 78 The election process can be
intensely political: candidates have been known "to campaign openly
in the United Nations' halls .. .. ,179
At first blush, this process may seem no more representative than
the quasi-democratic process by which the U.S. Senate confirms nom-
inees to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Senate process, too, can be
openly political, 10 but while the Senate confirmation process is clearly
less democratic than the popular election of representatives to Con-
175. See United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
176. BLACK, supra note 29, at 223.
177. See PHIuP BOBB1TT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 192-95 (1982). Professor Bobbitt also
suggests that constitutional review serves an "expressive" function, giving "concrete expression
to the unarticulated values of a diverse nation." Id. at 211.
178. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 2, 59 Stat. 1055,
1055, 3 Bevans 1179, 1179 (providing generally for election of World Court judges); id. art.
4, para. 1, 59 Star. at 1055, 3 Bevans at 1179-80 (providing for election by Council and
Assembly); id. arts. 5-12, 59 Star. at 1055-56, 3 Bevans at 1180-81 (establishing procedures
for nomination and election of judges).
179. THOmAS M. FRANCK, JUDGING THE WORLD COURT 7 (1986); see also Abraham D.
Sofaer, Statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Dec. 4, 1985, reprinted in BARRY CARTER
& PHILLIP TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 299 (1991) (mentioning "electioneering" by candi-
dates for judgeships).
180. Cf. LAURENCE TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT 93-105 (1985) (arguing
that Senators should not hesitate to vote against a Supreme Court nominee based on the nominee's
judicial philosophy). Indeed, politicization of the appointments process, sometimes criticized as
a relatively new practice, was actually the norm in the early days of the Republic. See id. at 77-
92 (discussing the "myth of the spineless Senate").
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gress, the World Court selection process is clearly more democratic
than the selection of members in the Security Council, the law-making
body of the United Nations. Five of the fifteen members of the Security
Council are permanent and possess veto power over all Security Council
decisions. 181 The Charter does not, however, guarantee any of the five
permanent members of the Security Council representation on the
World Court. 18 2 No state is guaranteed a seat, and, unlike the justices
of the U.S. Supreme Court who enjoy life tenure, each World Court
judge must step down or run for re-election every nine years. 183 If the
Court exercises judicial review in the future, it will be at least partly
insulated from charges that its constitutional rulings will be carved in
stone; the authors of unpopular opinions can be removed after their
terms expire and their decision re-examined. Nor is "court-packing"
by any one state a possibility since the Court's statute provides that
no two judges may be nationals of the same state. 184 If the benchmark
of judicial legitimacy is the legitimacy of the selection process, the
World Court has at least as strong a claim to legitimacy as the U.S.
Supreme Court.
To date, the chief criticism of the Court is not that it is an anti-
majoritarian institution wielding too much power, but instead that it
is a weak, idle tribunal unable to enforce its own judgments. 185 This
181. See U.N. CHtaTER art. 23, para. 1 (providing for permanent members); id. art. 27,
para. 3 (requiring "concurring vote" of all five permanent members on substantive questions).
With the renaissance of the Security Council, the primacy of the Permanent Five is inevitably
leading to calls for reform. See Franck, supra note 143, at 523 (predicting that increased activity
by the Council will increase pressure for reform).
182. FRANCK, supra note 179, at 7 (noting that the Charter does not guarantee permanent
members of the Council a seat on the Court). It is true that, in practice, each of the five
permanent members of the Security Council has almost always been represented on the Court,
the exception being China shortly after World War II. Id. at 7. But these states also account
for a sizeable portion of the world's population, and in any event, their presence on the Court
is never guaranteed. With the change in governance in Moscow, the Soviet seat is now held by
Russia.
The five permanent members of the Security Council now are China, France, Russia, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. Cf. U.N. CHARTER art. 23, pam. 1 (naming the
Soviet Union, not Russia, as one of the five).
183. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 13, para. 1, 59
Star. 1055, 1056, 3 Bevans 1179, 1181-82.
184. See id. art. 3, para. 1 at 1055, 3 Bevans at 1179. It is always possible, of course, that
a cabal of states would team up to pack the Court with like-minded judges from countries of
similar political orientation, but this possibility is greatly dampened by the diverse character of
the General Assembly and the rotating membership of the Security Council. See U.N. CHARTER
art. 9 (providing that all Members of the United Nations be represented in the Assembly); id.
art. 23, para. I (providing for election of non-permanent members of the Council by the
Assembly); Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 4, para. 1, 59
Stat. 1055, 1055, 3 Bevans 1179, 1179-80 (providing for election of Court members by the
Assembly and the Council).
185. See Jonathan 1. Charney, Disputes Implicating the Institutional Credibility of the Court:
Probleme of Non-Appearance, Non-Partiipation, and Non-Performance, in THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS 288 (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed., 1987) (arguing that in
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perception, however, may be changing; more states are accepting the
Court's compulsory jurisdiction, 18 6 and the Court's docket has grown
in recent years.' 8 7 And it may change further if the Court asserts a
power of judicial review more aggressively than it has in the past.
The Court's greatest challenge is simply to get states to take it more
seriously-to accept that the Court has enough authority to interpret
the Charter and challenge the other organs of the United Nations.
To be sure, the Court has its partisans, 8 but it also has more than
its share of critics, 8 9 many of whom will probably resist any expansion
of its power. Yet the Court may suffer most from the indifference and
ignorance of the international community. Most people (including
politicians) are unaccustomed to the idea of the Court playing a
significant role in international politics. Of course, the same might
have been said of the Security Council prior to the invasion of Kuwait.
The Council's improved political standing suggests there is hope for
the Court as well.
In any event, until the Court attains greater stature than it currently
enjoys, it is hard to imagine that it could fulfill the same "expressive"
function sometimes ascribed to the U.S. Supreme Court-that of
inspiring individual constituents with a vision of the Constitution. 190
The prestige of the U.S. Supreme Court is so great that holdings like
Brown v. Board of Education'91 and Miranda v. Arizona 192 have become
part of U.S. popular culture. 193 The World Court, by contrast, has
order to foster respect in the world community and improve its institutional viability, the World
Court should build a solid record of success in noncontroversial matters); see also Mary Helen
O'Connell, The Prospects for Enforcing Monetary Judgments of tse International Court of Justice, 30
VA. J. INT'L L. 891 (1990); cf. Statement of the U.S. Dept. of State, Jan. 18, 1985, reprinted
in CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 179, at 297 (announcing that the United States "has decided
not to participate in further proceedings" in Nicaragua's suit relating to U.S. support for the
contras); United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3
(Judgment of May 24) (ordering Iran to release its hostages).
186. See, e.g., Paul Lewis, World Court Plan Meets Difficulties, N.Y. TIMaS, June 24, 1990,
at A9 (reporting that eight countries had recently decided to accept the World Court's compulsory
jurisdiction).
187. See Keith Higher, The Peace Palace Heats Up: The World Court in Business Again?, 85
AM. J. INT'L L. 646, 646 (1991) (noting that the "docket is crammed").
188. See, e.g., Franck, supra note 143, at 523 (stating that it is "reassuring" that the
International Court of Justice has "marked its role as the ultimate arbiter of institutional
legitimacy"); Thomas M. Franck, Let's Not Abandon the World Court, N.Y. TisasS, July 17,
1986, at A23 (arguing that the Court's decisions have, by and large, been fair).
189. See, e.g., Sofaer, supra note 179, at 298-99 (noting that only a minority of states accept
the Court's compulsory jurisdiction, and that a number of judges come from states that do not
accept the Court's compulsory jurisdiction).
190. See BOBBITrr, supra note 177, at 218-19 (describing the "expressive" function of the
U.S. Supreme Court).
191. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
192. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
193. See Eric Rieder, The Right of Self-Representation in the Capital Case, 85 CoLUM. L. Rsy.
130, 141 n.76 (1985) (noting that Miranda "has become deeply ingrained in the popular
consciousness" through exposure on television shows).
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rarely caught the imagination of the international community of states,
much less that of individual constituents within those states. 1
94
A more activist World Court could transform itself from a U.N.
backwater into an institution of major political importance. This
prospect has political implications for the more privileged members
of the current international legal order-in particular, the permanent
five members of the Security Council. Part IV considers this point in
greater detail. For now, it seems reasonable to conclude that whatever
the political objections to a greater role for the Court, the anti-
majoritarian critique is not fatal.
B. Interpreting the U.N. "Constitution": The Charter and Other Sources
Apart from the anti-majoritarian difficulty, a newly activist World
Court faces another set of daunting obstacles: the problem of defining
what is the "constitution" of the United Nations, and the even greater
problem of interpreting that constitution. The U.N. Charter is, in
one sense, a constitutive document; it establishes the organs of U.N.
government, it lays down rules' of governmental procedure, and it
provides some substantive norms for international conduct. In another
sense, the Charter is just another treaty; other sources of international
law, both predating and postdating the Charter, establish in much
more detail the "fundamental" substantive norms by which states must
conduct themselves. Long before the Charter, for example, customary
international law prohibited piracy and genocide; those customary
norms are stronger than ever today. 195 Indeed, peremptory norms of
customary international law, or jus cogens, more closely resemble the
foundational norms in the U.S. Bill of Rights than any provision of
the Charter itself.
Still, even if it does not embody the entire U.N. "constitution,"
the text of the Charter does provide a viable starting-point for the
Court's review of an act by another U.N. organ. On some procedural
questions, the Charter's text is often dispositive. The General Assem-
bly can pass only hortatory resolutions,196 and important questions in
the Assembly require a two-thirds majority. 197 Decisions of the Se-
curity Council, by contrast, are binding on member states. 198 Security
194. This is so in part because only states, and not individuals, may be parties before the
World Court, Statute of the International Court ofJustice, June 26, 1945, art. 34, para. 1, 59
Sta. 1055, 1059, 3 Bevans 1179, 1186, which means it is unlikely that the Court will directly
affect individual lives. But the Court's opinions could still seep into popular consciousness as
the Court plays a more active role.
195. See RESTATEMENT, rupra note 14, § 404, at 255 n.1.
196. U.N. CHARTER art. 10.
197. Id. art. 18, para. 2.
198. Id. art. 25.
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Council decisions on non-procedural matters require nine votes, in-
cluding the concurring votes of the permanent five members. 199
Unfortunately, the Charter offers much less clear guidance as to
when Council and Assembly resolutions violate substantive, founda-
tional norms. 20 0 The World Court appears to be at a disadvantage on
this question when compared with the U.S. Supreme Court. For all
the apprehension about the pitfalls of interpretivism, the U.S. Con-
stitution is easier to interpret than the U.N. Charter. As Professor
Ely has observed, the U.S. Constitution contains provisions "ranging
from the relatively specific to the extremely open-textured," and at
least some of the specific provisions are straightforward in applica-
tion. 20 1 The Bill of Rights may seem hopelessly vague to students of
the U.S. Constitution, but it is a model of clarity and detail compared
with the corresponding provisions of the U.N. Charter.
Indeed, the Charter has no Bill of Rights for states at all. 20 2 A few
provisions purport to protect states' rights, but they do so only in the
most general terms. Chief among them is article 2(7), which provides
that "[njothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of any state .... " Even this protection is
limited by the last clause of the same paragraph, which provides that
"this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement
measures under Chapter VII." Other provisions are equally imprecise.
Article 1(2) asserts that the purpose of the United Nations is to
"develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples"-an equal
protection clause for states. The beginning of article 55 repeats this
language. Judge EI-Kosheri, dissenting in Libya v. United States, in-
voked these three articles in defending Libya's "sovereign rights" not
to extradite its own nationals. 20 3 If the World Court is to exercise
199. Id. art. 27, par. 3. Even this fairly clear provision has required a little creative
interpretation. A permanent member can "concur" by abstaining. See Namibia Case, 197 1 I,C.J.
at 22.
200. It may be that by omitting substantive norms from the Charter, the framers sought to
distinguish between "substantive" and "procedural" invalidity. Cf. Osieke, supra note 23, at 243
(arguing that international review bodies sometimes distinguish between "substantive" and
"procedural" ultra vires acts). However, as in the domestic sphere, the difference between
"substantive" and "procedural" norms can be difficult to determine. See id. at 244. Moreover,
the framers seem to have envisioned that any interpretation of the Charter, whether on a
substantive or procedural point, would be void if not "generally acceptable." See supra part I.B.
20L ELY, supra note 167, at 13.
202. The Charter does contain two important provisions on individual human rights, but
even these speak in general terms. See U.N. CHARTBR. arts. 55-56. The provisions have not had
great influence in U.S. courts, at least not as of yet. See, e.g., Sei Fujii v. California, 242 P.2d
617 (1952) (holding that the provisions are not self-executing).
203. Libya v. United State, 1992 I.C.J. at 211 (EI-Kosheri, J., dissenting).
1993 / The World Court and Judicial Review
judicial review in the name of states' sovereign rights, its chief textual
support in the Charter must come from these general provisions.
The "equal protection" norms in article 1(2) and article 55 do
provide some solid textual basis for "constitutional" review. The U.S.
Supreme Court has filled volumes in construing an equal protection
clause that is hardly more precise than these provisions. The equal
protection clause of the U.S. Constitution is "self-executing": it com-




Article 1(2) and article 55 are framed in a less prohibitory fashion;
they hold that the "purpose" of the United Nations is to act "based
on respect" for equal rights and self-determination of peoples. 20 5 It is
unlikely that the framers would ever have approved a Charter permit-
ting the United Nations to discriminate arbitrarily against individual
states. Nevertheless, this "equal protection" language is firm enough
to form the basis for a robust equal protection jurisprudence.
Apart from the "equal protection" norms, however, there is little
raw material in the Charter with which the Court can analyze questions
of states' rights. Article 2(7), which forbids the United Nations to
interfere in matters within a state's "domestic jurisdiction," is the
closest thing in the Charter to a states', Bill of Rights, but it obviously
lacks specifics. It does not expressly say that states should not be
subject to "cruel and unusual punishment." It does not expressly assure
states "due process" if their territory is taken, or if they are punished
for unlawful behavior-rights asserted by Iraq in the Gulf War. It
does not provide that states have a right of "free speech"--a right to
express their views without fear of retribution. 20 6 Nor does article
2(7), or any other provision of the Charter, expressly provide that
states are never bound to extradite their own nationals-a right as-
serted by Libya in the Lockerbie case. Most importantly, article 2(7)
is itself limited in scope. It provides that "this principle shall not
prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII."
Yet these are precisely the kinds of "measures" most likely to be
challenged in contentious cases, since they are the only ones that are
binding. 20 7 In light of this, the World Court can hardly rely on article
204. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("nor shall any State ... deny to any person the equal
protection of the laws").
205. Some U.S. authorities hold that a treaty provision is self-executing if it provides that
"certain acts shall not be done, or that certain limitations or restrictions shall not be disregarded
or exceeded by the contracting parties. ... Commonwealth v. Hawes, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 697,
702-03 (1878), cited with approval in United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 427-28 (1886).
206. Indeed, other sources of international law, directed as much to states as to individuals,
restrict some state "speech," such as "propaganda for war." See International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 20, para. 1, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
207. See U.N. CHARTER art. 25. The important resolutions on Iraq, Libya, and Bosnia were
adopted pursuant to Chapter VII. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 661, supra note 1 (invoking Chapter VII
to impose economic sanctions on Iraq).
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2(7) alone to invalidate Security Council decisions adopted pursuant
to Chapter VII. The Court will have to look beyond the Charter in
such cases.
It is unlikely that the Court will rely heavily on treaty sources to
measure the validity of Security Council resolutions. For one thing,
most international instruments on "rights" focus on individual human
rights, not states' rights. Examples include the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights20 8  and the international covenants on human
rights. 20 9 The United Nations General Assembly Declaration on
Friendly Relations Among States does contain some general provisions
on states' rights 2 °1 0 but it is a non-binding declaration of the General
Assembly rather than a full-fledged treaty.2 1 Although this declaration
may be evidence of customary international law, which can be binding,
it is not binding as a treaty per se. 212 Article 103 of the Charter would
make it difficult for the Court to rely solely on a treaty provision to
invalidate a decision of the Security Council since article 103, the
"supremacy clause," provides that Charter obligations prevail over
states' obligations under international agreements.
213
Interestingly, however, article 103 says nothing about customary
international law, leaving open the possibility that Charter obligations
may not always supersede obligations under customary law. At first
blush, the omission of customary law from article 103 seems odd; the
usual view is that treaties are at least as important a source of law as
customary law, if not more important. 2 4 The omission makes more
208. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
209. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec, 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3. Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter are also devoted to individual rights, although
article 55 also contains the states' "equal protection" clause previously described.
210. See G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Annex 1 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES12625
(1970), reprinted in IAN BROWNLIE, BASiC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 35, 40 (1983)
(providing that states shall not encourage terrorism or subversion in other states).
211. See BROWNLIE, supra note 210, at 35 (describing the declaration as evidence of state
practice). The fairly general "states rights" listed in the declaration should not "be construed as
affecting" obligations under the Charter, especially those relating to international peace and
security. See G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 210, 1.
212. See Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice, 178 RECUEIL DES COURS
111-21 (1982-V) (arguing that Assembly declarations may constitute evidence of customary
international law); qc Hiram Chodosh, Neither Treaty nor Custom: The Emergence of Dedarative
International Law, 26 TEx. INT'L L.J. 87 (1991) (arguing that declarations should have some
binding effect).
213. U.N. CHARTER art. 103.
214. See Phillip Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. REV.
665, 684-87 (1986) (arguing that U.S. courts have applied treaty law much more readily than
customary law); c. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, para.
1, 59 Star. 1055, 1060, 3 Bevans 1179, 1187 (describing both treaty and customary law as
sources of international law without suggesting that one overrides the other). Indeed, there are
suggestions in the domestic law of the United States and other countries that treaty law is
superior to customary law. See, e.g.. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (holding
that customary law controls "where there is no treaty").
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sense, however, when one considers the doctrine ofjus cogens-the rule
that states cannot agree by treaty to violate certain peremptory norms
of customary international law. 215 Indeed, the framers of the Charter
seem to have had such a limitation in mind when they wrote that an
interpretation of the Charter that was "generally unacceptable" would
be "void. '216 It is quite reasonable to conclude that the U.N. Charter,
itself a treaty, does not authorize acts that violate peremptory norms
of international law. Precisely what these peremptory norms are is a
matter of dispute. It is generally agreed, however, that states cannot
enter into treaties to commit genocide, to perpetuate slavery, to engage
in illegal aggression, or to perpetuate apartheid. 217 The test is whether
a very large majority of states believes that a practice is unacceptable
in any circumstances.
2 18
Judge Oda, concurring in the Libya case, may have been considering
the principle of jus cogens when he suggested that Libya might have
challenged the Security Council resolution by asserting "sovereign
rights under general international law."'21 9 It seems doubtful, however,
that the non-extradition of nationals is a peremptory norm of inter-
national law; states frequently vary that default rule in extradition
treaties. 220 Libya might have argued that Jus cogens should be defined
more broadly than it is, since non-extradition of nationals is a widely
accepted norm. But that argument would have required stretching the
traditionally narrow boundaries of the doctrine.
It is also possible that Judge Oda believed Libya could attack the
Security Council resolution with any rule of customary international
law, not only jus cogens. Thus Libya might have argued that the
widespread practice of refusing to extradite nationals, while not a
peremptory norm of international law, was nonetheless a rule of cus-
tomary law important enough to override a command under the
Charter.221 It may be that the Court views certain aspects of customary
215. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 50, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 344 (providing that a treaty is "void" if it conflicts with a principle ofjus cogens); id. art.
61 (providing that a treaty "becomes void" if it conflicts with an emerging principle ofjus
cogens). For a discussion of the doctrine ofjus cogens, see EDWIN MCWHINNEY, UNITED NATIONS
LAW MAKING 73-76 (1984).
216. See supra part I.B.
217. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 102, cmr. k, at 28 (describingjus cogens generally);
id. § 102, at 34 n.6 (listing examples).
218. See id. § 102, at 34 n.6.
219. Libya v. United States, 1992 I.C.J. at 131 (Oda, J., concurring).
220. See, e.g., Treaty of Extradition, June 8, 1972, U.S.-U.K., art. I, 28 U.S.T. 227
(providing for extradition of all offenders regardless of nationality).
221. In fact many states, and most civil-law states, consistently refuse to extradite their own
nationals; many are constitutionally forbidden to do so. See generally 6 MAajoiaE WHITEMAN,
DIGEST OF U.S. PRACrICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW § 18, at 865-84 (1968) (describing state
practice opposing extradition of nationals). Most such states have established nationality-based
criminal jurisdiction, which permits them to try their own nationals for serious crimes committed
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law-those dealing with the fundamental attributes of sovereignty,
such as territorial integrity and disposition of a state's nationals---as
more fundamental than rules not directly related to state sovereignty,
such as customary law of the sea. If this is the case, then the scope of
review of Security Council resolutions will be greatly broadened. In
effect, the Council could be forbidden not only to order genocide or
slavery, but also to alter expectations built up over years of consistent
state practice. Thus, Libya could challenge a Council resolution or-
dering it to extradite its own nationals by pointing to state practice
on extradition. Similarly, Iraq could challenge some Council resolu-
tions by pointing to the customary law requirement that force be
"necessary and proportionate," even when some use of force is
justified.
222
Nevertheless, it would seem paradoxical to rely on."ordinary" cus-
tomary law (as opposed to jus cogens), but not treaty law, as a basis for
"constitutional" review. Why should customary expectations be "con-
stitutionally" protected while treaty-based expectations are not?223
Treaty norms are often accorded more weight than customary norms.
Treaty law is easier to "find" than customary law: it is written down
for all to see, whereas customary law exists in the often unascertainable
practice of states. Why should Libya be permitted to challenge a
Security Council resolution that runs counter to the extradition prac-
tices of many (but not all) states and yet be precluded from challenging
the same resolution by resort to the Montreal Convention? These
considerations support a more limited scope of review, one that looks
to the text of the Charter as well as peremptory norms of international
law--jus cogens-but not to "ordinary" customary international law.
Political considerations also argue for a limited scope of review, at
least in the short term. The existing permanent members of the
Security Council, at last freed from the restraints of Cold War geo-
politics, are not anxious to see their resolutions blocked by a new
obstacle. If the Court were to jump suddenly from a deferential
"presumption of validity" to a close scrutiny of whether Council
abroad. See, e.g., Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 836
(1987) (citing examples from France and Germany). The United States, however, has long
declined to establish nationality-based criminal jurisdiction, insisting instead that states should
extradite their own nationals. See generally Geoffrey R. Watson, Offenders Abroad: The Case for
Nationality-Based Criminal Jurisdiction, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 41, 54-84 (1992) (arguing that
nationality jurisdiction is necessary to prosecute Americans who would otherwise escape punish-
ment for serious crimes committed abroad).
222. See Abraham D. Sofaer, Terrorism, the Law, and National Defense, 126 MIL. L. RnV. 89,
97 (1989) (noting that "limitations of necessity and proportionality are traditional, civilizing
constraints on the use of force").
223. See supra text accompanying note 213 (noting that article 103 would seem to prevent
the Court from invalidating a Council resolution solely on the basis of a treaty).
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resolutions conform with a broad range of customary law, it might
jeopardize the gains it has already made by moving cautiously toward
judicial review. Whatever the legal basis for a searching standard of
review, political reality argues for caution.
224
Political and legal considerations inform the debate over the legal
effect of a Court decision invalidating an act of another U.N. organ.
This issue is considered in Part IV.
IV. THE QUESTION OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
What is the legal effect of a World Court judgment that a Security
Council decision is ultra vires?225 Is the invalidated act void ab initio-
"as inoperative as though it had never been passed"?226 Or instead is
the result that "[the parties to that suit are concluded by the judg-
ment, but no one else is bound"?22 In other words, should the
international community accept a doctrine of judicial supremacy under
which the "constitutional" holdings of the Court are binding on all
other organs of the United Nations in all future cases?228 Or should
it accept a "Jeffersonian" doctrine of "concurrent review"229-that no
one organ of the United Nations has the final say on the interpretation
224. See Franck, supra note 143, at 523 (commending the court for its restraint).
225. This question need not be asked of ultra vires General Assembly resolutions since they
have no binding effect. See U.N. CHARTER art. 10 (providing that Assembly may make
"recommendations").
226. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886), quoted in TRIBE, supra note 29,
at 27.
227. Shepherd v. City of Wheeling, 30 W. Va. 479, 4 S.E. 635, 637 (1887), quoted in
TRIBE, supra note 29, at 27-28.
228. According to Professor Engdahl, this is the view that prevails in today's U.S. consti-
tutional discourse. See David E. Engdahl, John Marshall's 'Jeffersonian" Concept ofJudicial Review,
42 DuKE L.J. 279 (1992). In Engdahl's view, Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Marbury v.
Madison actually "states not the Federalist, but the 'Jeffersonian' concept of the practice now
commonly called 'judicial review'--that the Court's opinion on a constitutional question is
respected in a particular case, but no branch is bound by another's view on such a question
thereafter. Id. at 279-80 (emphasis added).
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) and Oregon v. Hats, 420 U.S. 714 (1975), exemplify
Engdahl's view that modem jurists have construed Marbury as endorsing the view that the
Supreme Court's opinions are binding on all other parties in all future instances. See also TRIBE,
supra note 29, at 34-42 (arguing that the Constitution "on various occasions gives the Supreme
Court, Congress, the President, or the states, the last word in constitutional debate").
229. See CRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JuDicIA. REViEw 94 (1986); Men-
delson, Jefferson on Judicial Review: Consistency Through Change, 29 U. CHI. L. R V. 327 (1962);
Engdahl, supra note 228, at 280-81 and accompanying notes (elaborating on this terminology).
Jefferson described his view this way:
Where different branches have to act in their respective lines, finally and without appeal,
under any law, they may give to it different and opposite constructions. . . . From these
different constructions of the same act by different branches, less mischief arises than from
giving to any one of them a control over the others.
Letter of Thomas Jefferson to G. Hay, June 2, 1807, 11 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
213 (Monticello ed. 1907). See also Letter of Thomas Jefferson to William C. Jarvis, Sept. 28,
1820, 15 id. at 277-78 (describing judicial supremacy as "a very dangerous doctrine indeed").
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of the Charter and that a decision of the Court must be respected in
the case that it resolves but not necessarily in future cases?
Although some commentators assert that the World Court should
act as the final "umpire" of interpretation of the Charter, 230 the text
and travaux prparatoires of the Charter do not clearly support this
view. As discussed in Part I, these sources do support the notion that
the Court can exercise some power of judicial review. The Charter
provides that the Court is the "principal judicial organ" of the United
Nations, implying some power to pass on the validity of the acts of
other organs, while the travaux preparatoires provide that a "generally
unacceptable" decision by a political organ could be ignored by other
organs, implying that the Court might decline to enforce such an
act. 231 These sources, however, do not provide much insight into the
appropriate legal effect of a Court opinion invalidating another organ's
decision.
Some constitutive language supports the "Jeffersonian" view. Article
59 of the Court's Statute states that "[the decision of the Court has
no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that
particular case." No such limitation appears in article III of the U.S.
Constitution. Moreover, the World Court did not inherit the common-
law tradition of law-making that helped persuade early Americans to
endorse judicial supremacy. 232 While the World Court has treated its
decisions as binding precedent, and these days appears to cite them
with increasing frequency, the Court's formal jurisprudence leans more
toward a European civil-law model than a common-law stare decisis
model.
233
The U.N. framers themselves seem to have endorsed the "Jefferson-
ian" view. The U.N. Conference's official report on interpretation of
the Charter contained the following language:
Difficulties may conceivably arise in the event that there should
be a difference of opinion among the organs of the Organization
230. See, e.g., Franck, supra note 143, at 523 (welcoming the prospect that the Court might
become the "ultimate arbiter of institutional legitimacy").
231. See supra parts L.A & B. Moreover, the three major World Court decisions on judicial
review also seem to endorse inquiry into the validity of acts of the political organs, but again
without specifying the consequence of their invalidity. See supra parts IL.A, B & C. The Court
did not reach that issue in any of these cases since it upheld the acts in question.
232. See Engdahl, supra note 228, at 294-97 (describing the influence of the common-law
tradition on the early development of the doctrine of judicial supremacy). Professor Engdahl
identifies two other factors that bolstered the doctrine: the naive assumption that constitutional
interpretation would be clear-cut, and Engdahl's conclusion that juries, in whom the Founders
had great faith, were often obligated to decide questions of law and not merely issues of fact.
See generally id. at 289-94.
233. But q. BREWER-CARfAs, supra note 8, at 193-94 (asserting that European states are
moving toward a centralized constitutional court that can invalidate legislative acts erga omnes-
that is, so that the law is not enforceable "anywhere or in any case").
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concerning the correct interpretation of a provision of the Charter.
Thus, two organs may conceivably hold and may express or even act upon
different views. Under unitary forms of national government the
final determination of such a question may be vested in the highest
court or in some other national authority. However, the nature
of the Organization and of its operation- would not seem to be
such as to invite the inclusion in the Charter of any provision of
this nature.
234
This apparent commitment to "concurrent review" is not entirely clear.
The report stressed that states or U.N. organs could submit Charter
disputes to the Court for resolution, 235 implying that the Court's view
on an interpretation question would be dispositive. Still, this language
does not necessarily mean that the Court's view would be controlling
in all future cases, but only that it would be controlling in that
particular case. Moreover, the report also suggested that the Council
or Assembly could choose a different method of resolving disputes,
such as an "ad hoc committee of jurists" that would "report its views,"
a "joint conference," or various other "expedients" that were "neither
necessary nor desirable to list or to describe in the Charter. '236 Such
a multiplicity of authoritative interpretive bodies hardly seems con-
sistent with a ful-bodied doctrine of judicial supremacy.
If, following article 59 of the Statute and the (admittedly ambig-
uous) intention of the framers, the Court's interpretation of the Charter
has "no binding force except between the parties and in respect of
that particular case," the Court's interpretation might still bind other
organs quite broadly in practice. In public international law, as in
much public law, a "case" is often a complex and multifaceted prob-
lem, not a simple bipolar dispute. 237 A decision that is binding only
in one "case" may still bind much of the world.
The Libyan case provides a good example. Suppose that Libya
eventually succeeds in persuading the Court to strike down the Security
Council resolutions ordering Libya to extradite its two nationals and
imposing worldwide aviation and diplomatic sanctions on Libya. Even
if those resolutions are invalidated only with respect to "that particular
234. Report of the Rapporteur of Comm. IV/2, Doc. 933, IV/2/42 (2), 13 U.N.C.I.O.
Docs. 703, 709 (1945).
235. Id. (providing that states are free to submit Charter disputes to the World Court "as in
the case of any other treaty," and that "it would always be open to the General Assembly or to
the Security Council, in appropriate circumstances, to ask the International Court of Justice for
an advisory opinion" on the meaning of the Charter).
236. Id. at 709-10.
237. Cf. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 ALv. L. REV.
1281, 1284 (1976) (arguing that many federal civil suits no longer resemble the traditional
bipolar model, but instead feature both "sprawling and amorphous" party structures and complex
remedies).
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case," their invalidation will change the rights and duties of every
country in the world, all of whom presently must refrain from certain
aviation and diplomatic interchange with Libya. A state not party to
the original suit might argue that the decision bound only "the
parties"--the United States and Libya-but if Libya were to seek a
judgment ordering that state to stop enforcing the sanctions, the Court
would almost certainly follow its own decision and rule for Libya. The
Security Council might pass a new resolution, imposing similar sanc-
tions, but a renewed Libyan court challenge would prevail again. Even
if the Security Council were free to adopt similar resolutions a year
later against another state on similar grounds, that state would surely
seek World Court review and would most likely win, assuming proper
jurisdiction.
The formal limits on the effect of the Court's decision, then, would
only make a difference if for some reason the next aggrieved party
does not or cannot bring suit in the World Court. This prospect
becomes less and less probable, however, as more treaties provide for
referral of disputes to the Court, more states accede to the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court, and more litigants obtain jurisdiction
through special agreement. 238 As a practical matter, limiting the
formal effects of a constitutional decision might have relatively little
consequence. In the international arena, in other words, "Jeffersonian"
judicial review might begin to resemble "limited judicial supremacy."
One common argument against the "Jeffersonian" model of "con-
current review" is that it lacks finality. 239 For the international system,
however, this may not be a liability.240 International law is notoriously
decentralized anyway. 241 It has never treated "finality" as an important
goal; in a community of sovereign states, dissent and deviation is
inevitable. Most rules of international law have not moved "vertically"
238. For example, the treaty at issue in Libya v. United States, the Montreal Convention,
provided for referral to the World Court. See supra note 140. In addition, the trend in recent
years has been for a greater number of states to accede to the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Court. See CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 179, at 307 (noting that six more states have accepted
the Court's compulsory jurisdiction in the past five years and that more are considering doing
so). The Statute of the Court, moreover, provides for jurisdiction by special agreement, which
creates the possibility that two states might agree to submit a "dispute" to the Court to test
the validity of an act of a U.N. organ. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June
26, 1945, art. 36, para. 1, 59 Star. 1055, 1060, 3 Bevans 1179, 1186.
239. See Engdahl, supra note 228, at 321-22 (describing this view).
240. Professor Engdahl argues that a Jeffersonian model would better serve the U.S. Consti-
rution, as well. In his view, the Republic benefits when constitutional debate is not cut off
suddenly, but instead is allowed to percolate in different branches of government. See generally
id. at 333-39.
241. Extradition, for example, is not governed by a single multilateral convention, but by a
huge web of interlocking bilateral extradition treaties. See 2 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: PROCEDURE 407 (1986) (noting that the United States relies on bilateral
extradition treaties).
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from the Security Council (or the World Court) down to individual
states; instead, they have developed "horizontally" from treaties and
state practice. The process has never encouraged "finality." True, the
international legal system has become more centered around the Se-
curity Council in the past two years, but World Court review will not
appreciably impede this process since in the vast majority of cases the
Court will surely sustain the Council's activity. In those rare instances
in which the Court does rebuff the Council, it will be able to issue
judgments that are final in the particular case and highly persuasive
in future cases. The Court will also be able to strengthen its precedents
by reaffirming them. As Jefferson himself put it, "uniform decisions
. . . so strengthen a construction as to render highly irresponsible a
departure from it. '242 If the Court persists, in other words, its judg-
ments eventually will be seen as "final."
In sum, a "Jeffersonian" model of judicial review would comport
with the history of the Charter and with the rule that Court decisions
bind only the parties to a case. A doctrine of judicial supremacy finds
less support in the text and negotiating history of the relevant U.N.
instruments. As a political matter, moreover, a doctrine of judicial
supremacy is more likely to provoke controversy among the permanent
members of the Security Council, most of whom are probably satisfied
with the traditional balance between a strong Council and a weak
Court. It may well be that any form of judicial review-Jeffersonian
or otherwise-will generate political opposition if announced more
openly than in Libya v. United States. The conclusion of this Article
examines some of these political considerations.
V. CONCLUSION
A system of limited judicial review could have significant advan-
tages. Such a regime would often serve to validate the acts of other
organs, 243 as has been the case in all three major World Court opinions
to date. It might, over time, enhance the Court's prestige enough
that Court opinions serve the same "expressive" function as some U.S.
Supreme Court opinions, 244 though it is admittedly unlikely that the
World Court will ever have much influence on any nation's popular
culture. It might, moreover, provide non-binding "cues" to other
organs of the United Nations, helping to harmonize differences among
them or at least to induce restraint. Obviously, however, the most
important aspect of judicial review--"Jeffersonian" or otherwise--is
242. 3 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARsHALL 605-06 (1919).
243. See BLACK, supra note 29, at 223 (arguing that judicial review can serve an important
"legitimating" function).
244. See BOBBiTr, supra note 177, at 218-19 (describing the "expressive" function).
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that it might, on rare occasion, "check" a rogue Security Council. The
desirability of this "checking" function is a potentially explosive po-
litical issue.
245
Many states are willing to tolerate such a "checking" function in
their internal constitutional systems-to concede that the judiciary
can sometimes say "no" to the executive or the legislature. Many of
those same states, however, are probably much less anxious to concede
that the international judiciary can sometimes say "no" to the inter-
national legislature. In particular, a "checking" function may seem
unnecessary to the Western powers, who are well-represented on the
Council. The United States, France, Britain and perhaps Russia have
no more interest in expanding the power of the Court than they do
in diluting their own power in the Council.
In the eyes of the developing countries, however, the Council looks
increasingly monolithic. Four of the five permanent Security Council
members are now "Western" or at least "pro-Western" democracies, if
one counts Russia. Even industrialized states like Germany and Ja-
pan---excluded from the Council as aggressors in World War II-
must wonder why they have no permanent seat while Britain and
France do. To the developing countries, the composition of the Council
creates the possibility that the Council will overstep its boundaries,
as some believe has already happened in Iraq and in Libya. 246 It is
true that the developing countries still have a reluctant spokesperson
on the" Security Council, the People's Republic of China. China has
quietly abstained on many of the Council's most momentous deci-
sions,247 and it is doubtless prepared to use its veto in what it views
as extreme cases. But the developing countries are surely uneasy about
relying on China to represent them in the Council, for it is possible
that the United States and other Western powers will continue to
attempt to "constructively engage" China.248 For these reasons, an
expanded role for the World Court is probably much more appealing
to developing countries than to Security Council members.
245. In the context of its time, by contrast, Marbury v. Madison "represented no novel
seizure of power," since the framers generally assumed the federal courts would have such power
anyway. TRIBE, supra note 29, at 25-26.
246. See United Nations: Growing Concerns Over Role of Security Council, supra note 6, at 1; cf.
Franck, supra note 143, at 523 (noting that many states "with little or no voice" in the Council
1are probably somewhat surprised to find that it may order them to take major steps that they
consider contrary to their national interest and that, moreover, are incongruent with expectations
created by multilateral treaties to which they are parties").
247. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 678, supra note 1, at 27 (authorizing use of force against Iraq)
(China abstaining); S.C. Res. 770, supra note 4 (authorizing use of force for humanitarian relief
in Bosnia and Hercegovina) (China abstaining).
248. Cf. James A. Baker, III, America in Asia, 70 FOREIGN AFJARs 1, 15-16 (Winter 199 1/
92) (defending the Bush Administration's efforts to draw China into the global economic and
political system).
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Whatever the merits of the political debate, the Court has done
well to avoid inflaming it. Unlike Marbury v. Madison, which was
handed down in a legal culture already receptive to judicial review,
Libya v. United States was handed down at a time of uneasy transition
in the global community. The Court was therefore prudent to issue a
cautious majority opinion, one that does not have the ring of John
Marshall about it. Nonetheless, the concurring and dissenting opinions
in Libya v. United States may eventually be remembered as the inter-
national Marbury v. Madison. Here, for the first time, a significant
portion of the World Court endorsed judicial review in a contentious
case. If the Court can consolidate its gains-by forthrightly announc-
ing a power of limited judicial review in an appropriate contentious
case-it may keep pace with the Security Council, whose power and
prestige only seem to grow. Otherwise the Court may become more
marginal than ever.

